Suchergebnisse

WHATEVER THE METHODS IT WILL ATTEMPT TO USE, CHINA SEEMS INCREASINGLY COMMITTED TO THE PRINCIPLE THAT ISLAM CAN BE POLITICALLY USEFUL TO CHINA. BUT THE FUTURE OF PEKING'S TIES WITH THE ISLAMIC WORLD IS PROBLEMATIC, & THE SINO-ISLAM RELATIONSHIP REMAINS A CONFRONTATION OF "TWO ENORMOUSLY SELF CONFIDENT CULTURES." ISLAM IS A 2-EDGED SWORD, & PEKING MAY FIND THAT ISLAM CANNOT PLAY THE ROLE OF LOYAL OPPOSITION.

This book, first published in 1986, provides a comprehensive look at the social, cultural, political and economic forces that shaped Libya following the 1969 revolution. Libya's political system under Qadhafi's Third Universal Theory is examined, as are the power structures - military, tribal, economic and religious.

Until the collapse of the Soviet Union ignited an explosion of interest in Central Asia, most outsiders considered the region a political backwater, an amorphous place of exotic peoples whose time of greatest power had long passed and whose future could have little impact on international affairs. This perception began to change during the 1980s when China's concern over the stirrings of ethnic separatism in Xinjiang helped focus international attention on Islamic revivalism in Central Asia.

Central Asia is where China and the Islamic world meet. Three of the five Central Asian republics created out of the demise of the USSR in late 1991 - Kasakhstan, Kirghizistan and Tajikistan - borders with Xinjiang. The Chinese leadership views Central Asia with deep apprehension. The paper examines the importance of Xinjiang for China, Chinese policy in respect of Central Asia and its implications in the Islamic world. (DÜI-Sen)

Economic and political effects of China's failure to support the use of force against Iraq.

Seit seinem Machtantritt 1969 hat Qadhafi versucht, Ägypten von einer Union mit Libyen zu überzeugen. Zu den Fragen, warum Ägypten für Qadhafi so eine zentrale Rolle spielte und warum er, angesichts anderer vorgeschlagener und auch versuchter Zusammenschlüsse, mit einem alternativen Bündnis nicht zufrieden sein kann, führt die Autorin historische, persönliche und ideologische Gründe an. Sie machen deutlich, warum es für Qadhafi für Ägypten keinen Ersatz geben und warum es für Ägypten keine Vereinigung mit Libyen unter Qadhafi geben kann. (DÜI-Ott)