Suchergebnisse

As a way of clarifying and evaluating competing claims made by writers on alliances and the balance of power, I extend recent work on the relation between bargaining and war to a three-state setting where coalitions are possible. I show that if what is commonly called "balancing" occurs at all, it is because it is seen as a way of reducing the risk associated with possible exogenous changes in the distribution of military capabilities. It is therefore not necessarily inconsistent with what is called "bandwagoning," but can actually make bandwagoning more likely. Moreover, balancing need not occur for international systems to be stable.

Evaluates the proposition that asymmetrical economic interdependence among states is a source of political power. Shows that asymmetrical economic interdependence does not imply that less dependent actors will be able to exercise political influence over more dependent ones. The use of economic interdependence for political influence requires, instead, that the exchange of economic resources for political concessions make both parties to a relationship better off than they would be if they bargained over the distribution of the gains from the economic relationship alone. (Abstract amended)