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The conventional wisdom of economic voting theory argues that a nation's economic performance drives electoral outcomes. Therefore, voters will hold an administration accountable for its economic stewardship. Austin Hart challenges the simplicity of this notion, drawing on cognitive-psychological research on priming to demonstrate that the intensity of voters' exposure to economic campaign messages systematically conditions the strength of the economic vote. However, this study goes further than simply saying 'campaigns matter'. Here, we learn that candidates who control the campaign narrative can capitalize on favorable economic conditions or - contrary to the predictions of conventional theory - overcome unfavorable conditions. Although the aim is not to dismiss the importance of structural variables in the study of elections, Hart shows that the choices candidates make about what to say and how often shape election outcomes in ways that cannot be explained by contextual or institutional forces alone.

The conventional wisdom of economic voting theory argues that a nation's economic performance drives electoral outcomes. Therefore, voters will hold an administration accountable for its economic stewardship. Austin Hart challenges the simplicity of this notion, drawing on cognitive-psychological research on priming to demonstrate that the intensity of voters' exposure to economic campaign messages systematically conditions the strength of the economic vote. However, this study goes further than simply saying 'campaigns matter'. Here, we learn that candidates who control the campaign narrative can capitalize on favorable economic conditions or - contrary to the predictions of conventional theory - overcome unfavorable conditions. Although the aim is not to dismiss the importance of structural variables in the study of elections, Hart shows that the choices candidates make about what to say and how often shape election outcomes in ways that cannot be explained by contextual or institutional forces alone

Correcting the relative lack of attention to the revenue side of public finance, this article examines to what extent globalization constrains partisan tax policy. The author hypothesizes that political ideology is still a good predictor of taxation in the neoliberal era, advancing this argument against the prominent globalization thesis: that global economic pressures have supplanted political ideology as the driving force of revenue policy. Although research in developed democracies identifies a resilient link between partisanship and policy outcomes, the impact of the drastic neoliberal transition on partisan policy making in the developing world remains poorly understood. Using time-series cross-section data to evaluate partisan taxation in South America, the author finds that partisanship is a reliable indicator of tax revenue in the neoliberal era. Counterintuitively, however, the promarket Right generates more tax revenue than the interventionist Left. The author argues that this previously unexpected revenue gap is driven by ideological concerns for equity versus growth. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

Correcting the relative lack of attention to the revenue side of public finance, this article examines to what extent globalization constrains partisan tax policy. The author hypothesizes that political ideology is still a good predictor of taxation in the neoliberal era, advancing this argument against the prominent globalization thesis: that global economic pressures have supplanted political ideology as the driving force of revenue policy. Although research in developed democracies identifies a resilient link between partisanship and policy outcomes, the impact of the drastic neoliberal transition on partisan policy making in the developing world remains poorly understood. Using time-series cross-section data to evaluate partisan taxation in South America, the author finds that partisanship is a reliable indicator of tax revenue in the neoliberal era. Counterintuitively, however, the promarket Right generates more tax revenue than the interventionist Left. The author argues that this previously unexpected revenue gap is driven by ideological concerns for equity versus growth.

This phenomenon of retrospective voting requires that individuals integrate and appraise streams of performance information over time. Yet past experimental studies short-circuit this 'integration-appraisal' process. This title develops a new framework for studying retrospective voting and present eleven experiments building on that framework.