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What is the effect of providing personally tailored budgetary information on public attitudes to tax and spending? We address this question with a survey experiment based on the annual tax summaries introduced by the UK tax authorities in 2014. By subtly manipulating the categories of state spending – in particular, the controversial category of 'welfare' – to invoke a sense of unfairness, we show how budget information in general and the United Kingdom's annual tax summaries in particular impact support for state spending. Though the stated aim of providing personalised tax receipts to income taxpayers is to enhance fiscal transparency, doing so may also damage support for state spending if the information provides a sense that existing redistribution is unfair. The article contributes to political science debates about public attitudes to tax and spending, the character and trade-offs of fiscal transparency, and the framing effects of welfare.

Recent accounts of British voting behaviour emphasise the importance of voters' valence judgements on deciding which party to support: significant numbers of voters do not rely on their membership of particular socio-economic groups or ideological preferences; instead, they rely on evaluations of government performance to determine their vote. Part of this evaluation comes from 'fast and frugal' heuristics such as their evaluations of party leaders and other senior politicians. Such heuristics have been shown to be influential in the United Kingdom's 2016 Brexit Referendum for example. We extend this research to show that the influence of leadership heuristics on individuals' chances of voting for Brexit varied depending on evaluations of leading politicians associated with the Remain and the Leave campaigns. Moreover, feelings toward the party leaders had a larger influence on the referendum votes of those holding middle-of-the-road views on Europe than on those who were themselves either strongly pro- or anti-EU.

Political scientists often debate how much information people have and deploy when making electoral decisions. Some scholars suggest that voters are aware of which party is likely to win in their local constituency at British general elections; however, this might not be the case in situations when there is substantial and spatially varying change in the relative fortunes of two or more parties between elections. That argument is evaluated here using as a case study the 2015 and 2017 general elections in Scotland: at the first, the SNP's vote share more than doubled, and it won 56 of the country's 59 seats, having won just six at the previous contest; at the second, its vote share fell by about a third, and it lost 21 of those 56 seats. Analysis of British Election Survey data collected before and during the campaigns preceding those elections shows that most respondents were aware of the SNP's surge in 2015 and expected their victory in every constituency. In 2017, most voters were aware which of the SNP's three competitors was the biggest threat in each constituency, and that awareness became clearer during the campaign; yet, voters – especially those who identified with the SNP and were contacted by it during the campaign – still (incorrectly) anticipated a local SNP victory.

The recent spate of mass public shootings in the United States raises important questions about how these tragic events might impact mass opinion and public policy. Integrating research on focusing events, contextual effects and perceived threat, this article stipulates that residing near a mass shooting should increase support for gun control by making the threat of gun violence more salient. Drawing upon multiple data sources on mass public shootings paired with large-N survey data, it demonstrates that increased proximity to a mass shooting is associated with heightened public support for stricter gun control. Importantly, the results show that this effect does not vary by partisanship, but does vary as a function of salience-related event factors, such as repetition, magnitude and recency. Critically, the core result is replicated using panel data. Together, these results suggest a process of context-driven policy feedback between existing gun laws, egregious gun violence and demand for policy change.

Parties' local campaign efforts can yield electoral dividends in plurality elections; in general, the harder they campaign, the more votes they receive. However, this is not invariably the case. Different parties' campaigns can have different effects. What is more, the particular status of a candidacy can also influence how effective the local campaign might be. Analyses of constituency campaigning at the 2015 UK General Election reveal inter-party variations in campaign effectiveness. But looking more closely at how a party was placed tactically in a seat prior to the election, and at whether sitting MPs stood again for their party or retired, reveals distinct variations in what parties stand to gain from their local campaigns in different circumstances.

An extensive literature demonstrates that local campaign efforts in the UK generally pay electoral dividends for parties. As a result, rational parties focus campaign efforts most in seats where the electoral outcome is not pre-determined and where a few more votes either way could change the result. An important indicator of where such constituencies can be found is provided by prior election results, and research has shown that rational parties tend to focus their campaigns most heavily on those seats where the previous election was close and less in seats where in the past they either lost badly or won comfortably. However, much less attention has been given to how local parties react to new information showing how the competitive situation in their area is changing as a general election approaches. We use data from a rare set of local opinion polls conducted in British constituencies in the run-up to the 2015 UK General Election. Although hampered by their generally small size, limited fund-raising capacity, and reliance on volunteers, we find that local parties do respond to new information. Our results indicate that parties tend to put more effort into local campaigns in seats where an opinion poll had been carried out than in otherwise similar seats where one had not. And, the more competitive the poll suggested their race was, the more resources they devoted to it.

AbstractRecent polls reveal that between 20% and 25% of Americans erroneously indicate that President Obama is a Muslim. In this article, we compare individuals' explicit responses on a survey about religion and politics with reaction time data from an Implicit Association Test (IAT) to investigate whether individuals truly associate Obama with Islam or are motivated reasoners who simply express negativity about the president when given the opportunity. Our results suggest that predispositions such as ideology, partisanship, and race affect how citizens feel about Obama, which in turn motivates them to accept misinformation about the president. We also find that these implicit associations increase the probability of stating that Obama is likely a Muslim. Interestingly, political sophistication does not appear to inoculate citizens from exposure to misinformation, as they exhibit the same IAT effect as less knowledgeable individuals.