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"Bargaining Theory, Civil War Outcomes, and War Recurrence: Assessing the Results of Empirical Tests of the Theory" published on by Oxford University Press.

"Civil War Termination" published on by Oxford University Press.

This study provides a critical examination of the relationship between segment states and nationalist crises through a consideration of Nicaragua's recent history. Nicaragua experienced a nationalist crisis from 1981 to the mid-1980s. That crisis ended with the creation of two autonomous regions on the Atlantic Coast. Although relations between the common state and the new segment state proved difficult over the next few years, the new arrangement held for two decades. Roughly around 2007, however, a new nation-state crisis emerged in Nicaragua. Taking advantage of the fact that Nicaragua provides an opportunity to compare two nation-state crises across time, this study asks whether the country's pattern of nation-state crisis, creation of a segment state, and emergence of a second nationalist crisis may mean that segment states are endogenous to nation-state crises. In addition, it raises the question of whether, if fully followed through, autonomy arrangements may prove stabilizing under certain contexts. Adapted from the source document.

Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (Cambridge 2009) offers a theory of the evolution of the modern state and an even more ambitious framework "for interpreting recorded human history." The book raises fundamental questions about the political structuring of violence, the functions of the rule of law, and the establishment and maintenance of political order. In doing so, it speaks to a range of political scientists from a variety of methodological and subfield perspectives. We have thus invited four prominent political science scholars of violence and politics to comment on the book: Jack Snyder, Caroline Hartzell, Jean Bethke Elshtain, and Larry Diamond.

Two different positions regarding the impact the fate of factions has on the duration of the peace appear in theories of civil war termination. One holds that the peace will be long-lived when the organizational structures of all but one of the factions that compete in a war are destroyed or dismantled at the conflict's end.The other position maintains that the peace can best be preserved when rival groups agree to share state power at the war's end. I examine the evidence for these competing arguments, drawing on a new dataset on the fate of factions that participated in civil wars between 1945 and 1999.The results of this analysis indicate that although destroying opposing groups' organizations has little effect on the duration of the peace, an agreement among rivals to share power can help to prolong the peace.

Although the majority of civil wars end when one warring party achieves a victory over the other, negotiated agreements are growing more common as a means of ending intrastate conflict. To explain why some negotiated settlements prove stable and others do not, scholars have examined the impact of factors such as superpower conflict, group identities, and third-party guarantors. This article argues that those negotiated settlements that are the most extensively institutionalized—that is, that provide institutional guarantees for the security threats antagonists face as they move toward a situation of centralized state power—are the ones most likely to prove stable. An analysis of all settlements negotiated to end intrastate conflicts during the period between 1945 and 1997 supports this proposition.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of tables -- Acknowledgments -- List of abbreviations and acronyms -- Introduction: Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars -- 1 After the Fighting Stops: Security Concerns, Institutions, and the Post–Civil War Environment -- 2 Creating Power-Sharing and Power-Dividing Institutions -- 3 Institutionalizing an Enduring Peace -- 4 Implementing Power-Sharing and Power-Dividing Agreements -- 5 Negotiating for Peace in Angola and the Philippines: Case Studies of Failure and Success -- Conclusion -- Appendix -- References -- Index

Power Sharing and Democracy in Post-Civil War States examines the challenge of promoting democracy in the aftermath of civil war. Hartzell and Hoddie argue that minimalist democracy is the most realistic form of democracy to which states emerging from civil war violence can aspire. The adoption of power-sharing institutions within civil war settlements helps mitigate insecurity and facilitate democracy's emergence. Power sharing promotes 'democratization from above' by limiting the capacity of the state to engage in predatory behavior, and 'democratization from below' by empowering citizens to participate in politics. Drawing on cross-national and case study evidence, Hartzell and Hoddie find that post-civil war countries that adopt extensive power sharing are ultimately more successful in transitioning to minimalist democracy than countries that do not. Power Sharing and Democracy in Post-Civil War States presents a new and hopeful understanding of what democracy can look like and how it can be fostered.