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In: Harvard studies in international affairs no. 43
In: Westview special studies on Africa
In: Princeton Legacy Library
In: Center for International Affairs
In: Henry L. Stimson lectures, Yale University
In: Princeton legacy library
Joshua M. Epstein argues that prevailing assumptions about the East- West balance of power rest on erroneous measures of military strength. He develops a method for analyzing military capabilities and applies that general procedure to the Soviet tactical air threat to NATO. Originally published in 1984. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905
In: Economic development reports no. 115
In: The Henry L. Stimson lectures series
Traditionally, Americans have viewed war as an alternative to diplomacy, and military strategy as the science of victory. Today, however, in our world of nuclear weapons, military power is not so much exercised as threatened. It is, Mr. Schelling says, bargaining power, and the exploitation of this power, for good or evil, to preserve peace or to threaten war, is diplomacy -- the diplomacy of violence. The author concentrates in this book on the way in which military capabilities -- real or imagined -- are used, skillfully or clumsily, as bargaining power. He sees the steps taken by the US during the Berlin and Cuban crises as not merely preparations for engagement, but as signals to an enemy, with reports from the adversary's own military intelligence as our most important diplomatic communications
In: Working Paper Series, 96-3
World Affairs Online
World Affairs Online
In: Working Paper Series, 4
World Affairs Online