Suchergebnisse

Abstract
The principle of proportionality has always operated as a means of protecting individuals from excessive uses of public power. When situated alongside the principles of conferral and subsidiarity, proportionality also possesses a federal dimension. In this guise, the principle limits the intensity of EU intervention in order to protect national regulatory autonomy. This federal element of proportionality has featured in recent Court of Justice of the European Union (cjeu) cases. For example, Member States have challenged European Union (EU) legislation for imposing disproportionate social and economic costs in their particular States. This article considers whether individuals can similarly challenge EU legislation for disproportionately interfering with the regulatory autonomy of the Member States? Having considered this question from the perspective of US federalism, it is argued that individuals are actually articulating "Member States' rights" in such cases. In so doing, attention is drawn to the question of whose rights and interests are really being articulated and balanced in these disputes.

Following the United Kingdom's vote to leave the European Union in a national referendum there has been much debate over the correct legal process to be followed under both domestic law and the EU Treaties to give effect to this decision. This paper seeks to contribute to these discussions by focusing on an aspect of the withdrawal process which, in the author's view, has not been given full consideration to date; namely, the need for the consent of the European Parliament before any withdrawal agreement may be completed.

Abstract
A new legal order has arisen in the United Kingdom ('UK') following that country's withdrawal from the European Union ('EU'). Nowhere are these changes more evident than in the complex rules that have emerged in the fields of freedom of movement and the right to work. In evaluating the new legal landscape, this Article has two overarching aims. The first is to assess the level of protection granted to the right to work and associated free movement rights within EU and UK law, including the terms of the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement. The second aim is to examine the extent to which those right to work rules are reflective of the status of the right to work as a fundamental social right. It is argued that Brexit unmoors the right to work from EU free movement rules, thereby undermining the normative value of that right, while exacerbating flaws in domestic rules governing access to employment for both national and migrant workers.