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We consider a politician's choice of whether to be evaluated, either by subjecting himself to a detailed interview or by asking for the appointment of a special prosecutor. If politicians are risk-neutral, then in equilibrium all choose to be evaluated. If politicians are risk-averse, then whether when they do or do not know the quality of their own actions, stable equilibria may exist in which politicians can avoid evaluation, or prefer evaluation by a body which can poorly discriminate between good and bad actions. The ability of voters to distinguish between good and bad politicians may therefore be limited.

Outcomes are considered when government cannot commit to programs. It is found that welfare can be higher when information is poor, government should at times commit to continuing a program it believes to have failed, & a government that fears losing power may acquire either too much or too little information. 2 Figures, 1 Appendix, 25 References. Adapted from the source document.

Consider a government that adopts a program, sees a noisy signal about its success, and decides whether to continue the program. Suppose further that the success of a program is greater if people think it will be continued. This paper considers the optimal decision rule for continuing the program, both when government can and cannot commit. We find that welfare can be higher when information is poor, that government should at times commit to continuing a program it believes had failed, and that a government which fears losing power may acquire either too much or too little information.

AbstractWe consider a loss system with a fixed budget for servers. The system owner's problem is choosing the price, and selecting the number and quality of the servers, in order to maximize profits, subject to a budget constraint. We solve the problem with identical and different service rates as well as with preemptive and nonpreemptive policies. In addition, when the policy is preemptive, we prove the following conservation law: the distribution of the total service time for a customer entering the slowest server is hyperexponential with expectation equal to the average service rate independent of the allocation of the capacity. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 81–97, 2015