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The paper compares the broad outlines of decentralization taking place in India, dating from the last decade of the past century, with that of Indonesia in the first decades of the present one. It focuses on the generally acknowledged least successful of reforms, namely that of public administration. Public administration tends to reflect the respective country's prevailing norms. The paper opens with the more important contrasts between India and Indonesia with reference to governmental structure, respective colonial heritage, and focus of decentralization efforts. The crux of the paper is whether administrative decentralization furthers, hinders, or is neutral with regard to bureaucratic reform. Assessment of successes and failures leads to discussion of continued, if not higher, levels, of corruption/dysfunctional behaviour at all levels in the civil service. After disposing of misconceptions of the Weberian bureaucratic system inherited from the colonial past, possible improvements are postulated. Not surprisingly these originate from application of New Public Management (NPM), with a couple of new wrinkles. Such reform depends upon general public engagement. In comparison with India's spontaneous mass demonstrations, hunger-strikes, and highlevel public condemnation of mega public corruption, this is conspicuous by its absence in Indonesia, where concentration has been on an anti-corruption court supplemented by experiments with a fledging evaluation system to monitor local progress on decentralization.

An actor perspective within a moralistic approach to corruption in india and Southeast Asia contrasts to a (Weberian) institutional one. This emphasizes local values which help explain apparent lack of social constraints to everyday corrupt practices as bribery. In Karnataka the approach indicates that status and power within one's own community gained by amassing wealth however acquired overrides morality; overstepping moral taboos can easily be rectified through an appropriate ritual. In post-coup Thailand morality is defined by emulation of King Bhumibul Aduilyadej. At present it is almost the sole criterion for political power, rejection of which is seen as immoral and hence punishable. Like Thailand, Indonesia lacks cultural possibilities of converting wealth to status and power. Those who cannot become a part of the bribetakers must endure as bribe payers. The remedy to corruption is purely institutional, i.e., an anti-corruption commission with wide ranging powers but with little noticeable effect.

India is a country characterized by multi-layered diversity and cultural heterogeneity where different types of inequalities and poverty have always been a fact of life. Since independence in 1947, she followed a development policy based on interventionist central planning and import substitution with the objective of reducing inequality and poverty. Policymakers adopted a middle path in which income inequality was tolerated, provided it was not 'excessive' and led to a higher rate of growth. From the mid-1980s, the Indian government gradually adopted market-oriented economic reforms. The pace accelerated during the early 1990s with the adoption of neo-liberal reforms programmes, marking a period of intensive economic liberalization. The focus changed from state intervention for more equitable distribution towards liberalization, privatization and globalization. During the past two decades, India has made rapid economic progress resulting in an expanding middle class with unprecedented access to goods and opportunities. Yet, it is not only that the new income generated by economic growth has been very unequally shared, but also the resources newly created have been inadequately utilized to alleviate the enormous social and economic deprivation of a majority of the society. This paper analyses the nature and causes of inequality and poverty in India.

Though cooperative organizations in India have been extensively used by the state as a tool for promoting rural transformation, they have generally not been successful. A major reason for the failure of cooperatives has been the inability of the state to create an environment conducive for people to cooperate. It is argued here that for rural development organizations in general, & cooperatives in particular, to be successful, the state must actively change the environment in a direction that would enable organizations to function in social as well as economic terms. 2 Figures, 45 References. Adapted from the source document.