Suchergebnisse

What drives individuals to condone state torture? This article advances our understanding through a brief systematic literature review and an exploratory analysis of existing studies. It reviews and probes the results of prior research collectively in order to serve as a starting point for future research. It finds that, across a selection of existing survey experiments, certain sub-groups are influenced by variations in the context in which torture take place, while others hold categorical views. In democracies especially, insights into what shapes public attitudes towards state torture, and among whom, can be informative for the protection of human rights.

There is a growing consensus that repression and counter-insurgency can be effective when selective. Yet the empirical evidence is mixed and theories specify that (unmeasured) perceptions of target selection matter. This article addresses this gap by directly measuring individuals' interpretations of a coercive policy which varies in target selection. It employs original surveys with Palestinians on their exposure to house demolition, views on the policy and attitudes towards the Israel–Palestine conflict. The study finds that when interpreted as indiscriminate, house demolition increases opposition to compromise. The results are consistent when perceived target selection is manipulated in an embedded survey experiment.

Counterinsurgency, state repression and other forms of coercion have multiple adverse effects. Although a state's use of threats and force should deter an opposition group, these measures often stimulate resistance. And although state-led coercion aims to influence an opposition group, coercive practices have social, economic and political consequences for civilians. This dissertation studies the efficacy and effects of coercive policies in the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict. The four composite essays investigate the impact of Israel's practice of house demolition and construction of a separation barrier on Palestinians' conflict preferences and use of violence, as well as the broader consequences of these policies for Palestinian communities. Essay I questions the conventional wisdom that the selective targeting of militants can be an effective counterinsurgency strategy. Through a survey of Palestinians, it demonstrates that house demolition can generate opposition to peace when it is perceived as indiscriminate in its targeting, even if it is selective by design. Essay II distinguishes between the mechanisms of collective threat and personal fear in state repression. In a longitudinal study of administrative demolition orders, it finds that orders issued against communal structures increase preferences for violence and militant political parties, suggesting that collective threats backfire. Essay III quantifies the economic consequences of counterinsurgency by measuring the separation barrier's impact on Palestinian employment and wages. It further shows that this economic impact increases the rate of Israeli conflict fatalities, demonstrating that economic consequences of coercion can stimulate violent resistance. Essay IV conceptualises a state's separation and exclusion of particular population groups as a general phenomenon and form of state repression. It draws on historical cases worldwide and presents the enclosure of Palestinian communities in special zones of the separation barrier as a contemporary example. The essays are empirical studies which use survey methods, quantitative analysis, principles of experimental design, qualitative sources and field work as a basis for description and explanation. As a whole, the dissertation contributes to the study of coercion by calling attention to understudied forms of coercion and identifying particular mechanisms by which threats and force can result in adverse effects.

There is a growing consensus that repression and counter-insurgency can be effective when selective. Yet the empirical evidence is mixed and theories specify that (unmeasured) perceptions of target selection matter. This article addresses this gap by directly measuring individuals' interpretations of a coercive policy which varies in target selection. It employs original surveys with Palestinians on their exposure to house demolition, views on the policy and attitudes towards the Israel–Palestine conflict. The study finds that when interpreted as indiscriminate, house demolition increases opposition to compromise. The results are consistent when perceived target selection is manipulated in an embedded survey experiment.

Even as the protection of civilians becomes a widely held norm, there is substantial variation in public support for humanitarian policy efforts. We use a survey experiment in Sweden to gain insights into this puzzle. Our survey confirms that citizens generally support military, but particularly non-military, means of civilian protection. Yet, we also find that support is partly particularized. Specifying that civilians may have ties to extremist groups (as victims or supporters) reduces support for proposals to provide humanitarian aid, contribute to UN observer missions and accept refugees. We trace this reduced support to lower moral obligation and higher threat perceptions. In contrast to expectations, respondents do not prioritize the protection of co-nationals, or women and children. Manipulation checks suggest the explanation that perceptions of who constitutes a civilian are subjective. Our findings provide insights into the domestic political determinants of atrocity prevention abroad.

Abstract
Even as the protection of civilians becomes a widely held norm, there is substantial variation in public support for humanitarian policy efforts. We use a survey experiment in Sweden to gain insights into this puzzle. Our survey confirms that citizens generally support military, but particularly non-military, means of civilian protection. Yet, we also find that support is partly particularized. Specifying that civilians may have ties to extremist groups (as victims or supporters) reduces support for proposals to provide humanitarian aid, contribute to UN observer missions and accept refugees. We trace this reduced support to lower moral obligation and higher threat perceptions. In contrast to expectations, respondents do not prioritize the protection of co-nationals, or women and children. Manipulation checks suggest the explanation that perceptions of who constitutes a civilian are subjective. Our findings provide insights into the domestic political determinants of atrocity prevention abroad.

The outbreak of COVID-19 has ushered in a global rise in state surveillance. In an effort to trace the spread of the disease and to enforce lockdowns, governments in democracies and autocracies alike have turned to surveillance technologies such as contact tracing apps. Governments have also tightened their hold on communication flows in other ways, through censorship and information manipulation. These kinds of government actions are not new: States have long recognized the value of controlling information in times of crisis. In this article, we consider these tactics in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, in which, unlike most other security threats, the threat posed is not endogenous to governance and applies to all countries. We consider how observations from this context prompt future research and reflect on the implications of information control for civil liberties.

Threats and force, by increasing expected costs, should reduce the target's resolve. However, they often seem to increase resolve. We label this phenomenon provocation. We review instances of apparent provocation in interstate relations and offer a theory based on the logic of reputation and honor. We also consider alternative explanations: confounding or mis-imputation of resolve; revelation of information, character, or capabilities; or generalized sunk cost reasoning. Using survey experiments, we systematically evaluate whether provocation exists and what may account for it. We employ design-based causal inference techniques—a hypothetical natural experiment, a placebo treatment, and ruling out mediators—to evaluate our key hypotheses. We find strong evidence of provocation and suggestive evidence that it arises from considerations of honor, vengeance, and reputation. Our experimental design minimizes the risk that this result arises from our alternative explanations.

Threats and force, by increasing expected costs, should reduce the target's resolve. However, they often seem to increase resolve. We label this phenomenon provocation. We review instances of apparent provocation in interstate relations and offer a theory based on the logic of reputation and honor. We also consider alternative explanations: confounding or mis-imputation of resolve; revelation of information, character, or capabilities; or generalized sunk cost reasoning. Using survey experiments, we systematically evaluate whether provocation exists and what may account for it. We employ design-based causal inference techniques—a hypothetical natural experiment, a placebo treatment, and ruling out mediators—to evaluate our key hypotheses. We find strong evidence of provocation and suggestive evidence that it arises from considerations of honor, vengeance, and reputation. Our experimental design minimizes the risk that this result arises from our alternative explanations.