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In this paper we highlight aspects related to the links between international migration, foreign tied aid and the welfare state. We model migration as a costly movement from an aid-recipient developing country with low income, poor infrastructure, and no welfare system, towards a rich donor, developed country with a well-developed welfare system. Within this model we find, among other things, that the best response of the developed donor country is to increase aid as the co-financing rate by the recipient country increases. When the immigration cost decreases, e.g. due to greater economic integration between the two countries, it is beneficial for the donor country to increase aid.

Open economy macroeconomic models generally overlook the effects of
international migration and remittances on income and welfare. A
two‐country temporary equilibrium model is presented which incorporates
trade theoretic elements of international migration and remittances. In
the model, an expansionary incomes, or a trade, policy by the host
country induces migration, while expansionary demand policies in the
source country discourage migration. In all cases, however, when some
degree of international migration exists, potential income and welfare
gains to both countries induced by such policies exceed the equivalent
policy gains where international migration and remittances are absent.

We consider a general equilibrium trade model of a small open economy with a representative consumer, where labour supply is variable, where imports are restricted by a small tariff, a quota or a voluntary export restraint (VER), and where alongside the production of two traded goods—one imported and one exported—a pure public good is produced and funded through an income tax. Within this framework, we demonstrate, among other things, that under certain conditions, while a small tariff or quota reduces employment and welfare, a VER may increase them. Thus, in the context of a small open economy, contrary to standard results, in certain cases VERs may become the welfare‐ and employment‐dominant instrument over the alternative import restrictions.

AbstractWe construct a two-country trade model where emissions are an input in production and generate cross-border pollution. We examine the strategic incentives of an active regulator who sets a binding level of emissions in production. We show that, in the presence of terms of trade and emission leakage strategic motives, tighter regulation can mitigate emission leakage, reduce global pollution, and improve a country's welfare. This result and the corresponding policy implications depend on the relative magnitude of emissions intensities of goods between sectors and on their relationship in production and consumption.

We explore the possibility of achieving a cooperative outcome when governments act non-cooperatively in a strategic environmental policy model where emission permit markets are linked. We introduce a specific distribution scheme of the permit revenues between the exporting countries so as to sustain the cooperative outcome as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Participation in the scheme is endogenized and we show that it constitutes a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as long as the countries are not too asymmetric. Our results are robust once we allow for multiple pollutants, different modes of competition and market power in the permits market.

We construct a perfectly competitive model of two symmetric countries producing tradable commodities and a public consumption good. Destination‐ or origin‐based taxes are levied on the consumption of the tradable goods. In both countries, a fixed wage leads to involuntary unemployment. We derive the Nash equilibrium consumption taxes under the two taxation principles with endogenous world prices, and compare them to (i) the cooperative rates, and (ii) the rates when world prices are fixed. We demonstrate that with endogenous world prices, the induced terms‐of‐trade effects cancel out under the destination principle, but they prevail under the origin principle of taxation. Nash equilibrium destination‐based taxes are inefficiently low when the exporting sector in each country is non‐labour‐intensive. The Nash equilibrium origin‐based taxes can be either higher or lower than the corresponding cooperative rates.