Suchergebnisse

Frontmatter --Contents --Preface --1. The Search for a Sure Thing: Risk and International Political Economy --2. Creating an International Risks Insurance Regime, 1870-1914 --3. Testing the Limits of Private Protection, 1917-1939 --4. Redefining Risk and Responsibility, 1979-1989 --5. The Infrastructure of Global Capitalism --Notes --Selected Bibliography --Index

Increasing economic competition combined with the powerful threat of transnational activism are pushing firms to develop new political strategies. Over the past decade a growing number of corporations have adopted policies of industry self-regulation-corporate codes of conduct, social and environmental standards, and auditing and monitoring systems. A Public Role for the Private Sector explores the phenomenon of industry self-regulation through three different cases-environment, labor, and information privacy-where corporate leaders appear to be converging on industry self-regulation as the appropriate response to competing pressures. Political and economic risks, reputational effects, and learning within the business community all influence the adoption of a self-regulatory strategy, but there are wide variations in the strength and character of it across industries and issue areas. Industry self-regulation raises significant questions about the place of the private sector in regulation and governance, and the accountability, legitimacy and power of industry at a time of rapid globalization

AbstractCoen and Pegram challenge us to integrate global governance theorising in ways that are pragmatic, policy‐oriented and interdisciplinary. One of the most prominent arenas for pursuing this challenge is through a focus on governing transnational production through voluntary and regulatory approaches. This focus directs attention to the structure and relationships within global value chains which influence the problems, actors, and mechanisms of global governance. Future research needs to explore how multiple governance initiatives within an industry interact, how issue boundaries evolve and change, the local implementation of global rules, and the relationships that shape governance outcomes.

The global promotion of transparency for the extractive sector—oil, gas and mining—has become increasingly accepted as an appropriate solution to weaknesses in governance in resource-rich developing nations. Proponents argue that if extractive firms disclose publicly their payments to governments, citizens will be able to hold governments accountable. This will improve the management of natural resources, reduce corruption, and mitigate conflict. These beliefs are embodied in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), initially a unilateral effort launched by Tony Blair that has evolved into a global program. Why has transparency become the solution of choice for managing natural resource wealth, and how has the EITI evolved? This article argues that intersecting transnational networks with complementary global norms facilitated construction of transparency as a solution for management of resource revenues. This in turn promoted the gradual expansion of the institutional architecture, membership, and scope of the EITI despite significant political barriers.