Suchergebnisse

I 2003 lancerede Tunesiens præsident Ben Ali en liberalisering af medielandskabet, der betød at private, tunesiske radio- og tv-stationer for første gang blev lanceret. En nærmere indsigt i disse nye medier viser blandt andet, at de blev lanceret for at sikre regimets magt.

Den ideologi, der blev grundlaget for alt i det nye selvstændige Tunisien, videreføres af det siddende regime i dag. Også på en række andre områder er Tunesien præget af den post-protektorate arv. En stor del af årsagen til, at såvel økonomiske som politiske reformer ikke har medført pluralisme og demokrati skal findes netop i det faværende opgør med denne post-protektorate arv.

On July 25, 2013 the drafting of a new constitution by the Tunisian Constitutional Assembly reached a complete impasse, following the assassination of opposition politician Mohamed Brahmi that very day. Fears mounted that the fragile democratization process would come to a halt. In 2011, free and fair elections had brought the Islamist democratic party Ennahda to power, which had formed a government with two smaller opposition parties. Simultaneously, other "old" opposition forces underwent internal reforms and strengthened their position in the new political landscape. Instead of building strong coalitions, these "old" forces re-activated old struggles and disputes. Only in July 2013, during the critical moment, did the political forces realize that they needed to enter into negotiations and dialogue with each other to save the country. The so-called Quartet was formed, which managed to convince most parties represented in the National Constitutional Assembly to accept their road map and enter into negotiations focusing on three main issues: governmental, constitutional and electoral. The National Dialogue did not unfold as a well-planned process with a thought-through design, but rather was a response to an acute political crisis. Hence, the Tunisian National Dialogue served as an instrument for crisis management, implemented while the crisis was still unfolding. The Tunisian National Dialogue was an ad hoc process, with many actors engaged on different levels and several parts of the process taking place at the same time.

This study responds to previous critique of the 'dialogue objective' of the Danish Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP). The 'dialogue objective' specifically refers to the second objective of the DAPP which is 'to improve dialogue, understanding and cooperation between Denmark and the MENA region (the Middle East and North Africa)'.1 A 2009 review and an evaluation conducted in 2013 both concluded that the DAPP 'dialogue objective' needed to be further clarified. Following from this critique the present study examines the 'dialogue objective'. The study was given the following three aims: 1. To analyse dialogue assumptions and approaches of DAPP interventions. 2. To review academic state-of-the-art theories on and methods for promoting dialogue. 3. To create tools for improving and documenting dialogue interventions. In the concluding remarks the study points to the need for future studies of dialogue within other modalities than the partnership modality, the impact of the 'dialogue objective' and a closer study of dialogue under the reform objective. Finally, the study suggests a future reconsideration of the overall frame of the DAPP, establishing a more self-confident narrative about the Danish experience of dialogue which could inform EU foreign policy, and considering the potential of dialogic interaction with new and old drivers of transition and democratisation in the MENA region for future engagement with the area.

In the wake of the protests that spread throughout the Middle East and North Africa in late 2010 and early 2011, Islamist movements of varying political persuasions have risen to prominence. This is especially the case in post-Mubarak Egypt and post-Ben Ali Tunisia. Popular Protest in the New Middle East examines Islamist approaches to political participation and integration and asks whether regional trends can be discerned with respect to either the strategy of disparate movements or the challenges they face. It offers analysis of the ideologies and actions of these movements, ranging from countries where Islamism is in control of the state as an Islamic theocracy (Iran), the ruling party (for example, Turkey), part of the ruling coalition (Lebanon), or a parliamentary minority (such as in Jordan or Yemen). Are Knudsen and Basem Ezbidi's analysis of the various experiences of protest, participation and integration make this book vital for researchers of the impact of religion on politics (and, indeed vice versa).

Peter Pawelka. - Umbruch und Wandel in der arabischen Welt. - Francesco Cavatorta/Rikke Hostrup Haugbølle. - "Dégage!" Das Ende des Autoritarismus in Tunesien?. - Thomas Demmelhuber. - Ägypten nach Mubarak - zum Militär und "Monopoly der Macht". - Rolf Schwarz. - Libyen und das Dilemma externer Interventionen. - André Bank / Erik Mohns. - Die syrische Revolte: Vom zivilen Protest zum Bürgerkrieg?. - Kevin Köhler. - Der Jemen zwischen Staatszerfall, Revolution und Bürgerkrieg. - Torsten Matzke. - Das Ende des Post-Populismus: Soziale und ökonomische Entwicklungstrends im "Arabischen Frühling". - Annette Jünemann. - Vorerst gescheitert: Perspektiven einer glaubwürdigen EU-Mittelmeerpolitik nach dem "Arabischen Frühling". - Nadine Kreitmeyr. - Israel und die Umbrüche im Nahen und Mittleren Osten: Konfrontation oder Annäherung?. - Hürcan Asli Aksoy. - Die Türkei im Nahen Osten: Neujustierung der türkischen Außenpolitik. - Oliver Schlumberger. - Der "Arabische Frühling" und das Versagen westlicher Außenpolitik: Eine Fata Morgana "politischer Stabilität"