Suchergebnisse

Non-state actors have been experimenting with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for two decades. This has become widely known over the 5 years, as both ISIS and the Houthis have adapted weaponized UAVs into their repertoires. As the Sahel and East Africa regions experience a rise in violence from non-state actors, and given that groups here are affiliated with groups in the Middle East, this paper seeks to explore the possibility and likelihood of weaponized UAVs being used on the battlefield in these regions. By utilizing both scholarly work and other reporting from these regions, this paper finds that there is a low risk of weaponized UAVs being adapted in these regions through organizational ties to groups in the Middle East. However, as UAVs are commercially available all over the world, groups with bomb-making experience and technical know-how in general may themselves develop local variations and adaptions of what Jihadist groups have done in the Middle East over the last decade.

UAVs have been used by non-state actors in the past decade. However, no known attack by right-wing extremists has been carried out using them. Håvard Haugstvedt reviews recent developments in attacks – through online activity in open forums and by examining groups that have already used UAVs in their operations – by such actors, to explore the possibility of right-wing extremists adopting UAVs. The article argues that right-wing extremist groups lack a strong entity, such as a state, backing their development and operations. However, terrorist groups learn from one another, and as extreme right-wing ideologies have gained currency among some members of the military and law enforcement agencies, the capability to develop and use UAVs may be more possible than that which has been revealed thus far. Nonetheless, this article casts doubt on right-wing extremists' capability and desire to incorporate UAVs into a violent repertoire that has historically been composed of fists, fires and firearms. ; publishedVersion

Researching sensitive topics, such as individuals about whom concern for radicalisation and violent extremism has been raised, demands a thoroughly contemplated approach. This is necessary for establishing trust with and accessing the research project's target group. As many projects are directed at professionals involved in the efforts to prevent violent extremism, and some of these workers have been found to struggle with this issue, the question should also be raised of how to approach these individuals in research. This paper draws on my experience from fieldwork throughout 2018, during which qualitative research was carried out through 17 in-depth interviews and two focus group interviews with experienced social workers involved in preventing radicalisation and violent extremism in Norway. This reflection started early in the data collection from the observation of participants being 'onstage' during interviews, appearing disconnected from their story. Applying Fook and Gardner's framework for critically reflective practice throughout the research process brought forth insights into researcher behaviour and sensitivity. 'Warming them up' and the 'specificity of practitioner experience' emerged as methodological themes from this reflective analytical process. These findings share commonalities with sensitive client work and research targeting individuals at risk of radicalisation; the researcher must be patient and thoughtful before he or she starts digging. The responsibility for the lack of rich descriptions therefore belongs to the researcher, who must cast a critical eye on his or her own research practice. In addition, asking specific questions raises concerns about the findings' validity if probing and closed-ended questions are not balanced with open-ended ones. ; publishedVersion

Extremist infiltration of armed forces, and the spread of violent radicalization among service members and former soldiers, are a growing international concern. With an increased number of active duty and former soldiers involved in extremist and terrorist milieus, the public fears that national security might be compromised by potential terrorists using their training, equipment, and networks against the countries they swore to protect. This is a serious impediment to the trust in authorities for many nations. However, little empirical research exists on either the scope of the problem, or the specific risk factors that might be involved in turning military personnel toward extremism. In this paper, we utilize the "Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States" (PIRUS) dataset to shed light on the vulnerability and risk factors into the extremist radicalization of military personnel. Our findings indicate that far-right radicalized individuals with military backgrounds are more likely to suffer from trauma, a diminution of social standing, having difficulties in romantic relationships, and exclusion from participation in social groups or organizations, compared to far-right radicalized individuals without military backgrounds. Mental illness, grievance, and anger toward society are also more present in the far-right military group compared to the non-military group. ; publishedVersion

To prevent radicalisation and violent extremism, many European countries have adopted a multiagency approach, consisting of both police, teachers and social workers. Such strategies have caused concern for a securitization of social policy and stigmatization of vulnerable groups. This study aims at gaining insight into how Norwegian social workers involved in prevention work against violent extremism experience and manage role conflicts and emotions during interaction with their clients. This article presents findings from 17 individual and two focus group interviews which indicate that social workers experience emotional strain caused by role conflicts and emotional dissonance within a securitized field of social work. To handle these challenges, social workers apply a dynamic combination of surface and deep acting strategies, at both the reactive and proactive level, such as 'Keeping a brave face', 'Character acting' and 'Adopting the client's perspective'. Our findings contribute to expanding both the empirical and conceptual understanding of emotion management at work, and provides a novel insight into how prevention work against violent extremism is perceived by social workers. Also, in a field influenced by security rhetoric, our study gives encouraging new knowledge about how social workers can resist falling into oppressive and controlling practices by seeking to engage with and understand their clients' human side, and relate this to their own lives.