Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- List of Tables, Figures, and Maps -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Introduction -- 2. A Theory of Asymmetric Interstate Coercion -- 3. Survival and Coercion Failure -- 4. The United States versus Iraq: The Gulf and Iraq Wars -- 5. The United States versus Serbia: Bosnia and Kosovo -- 6. The United States versus Libya: El Dorado Canyon, Pan Am Flight 103, and Weapons of Mass Destruction -- 7. Conclusion -- Appendix A: Coding U.S. Cases of Asymmetric Coercion -- Appendix B: Asymmetric Coercion Model -- Notes -- Index
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A war's conclusion can impact strategic thinking even when the outcome is misinterpreted or an outlier. For a century, Giulio Douhet in Command of the Air, 1921 and a 1926 revision, has been the prophet for the utilitarian morality of bombing cities to gain decisive victory. His earlier work, Winged Victory: How the Great War Ended, written in 1918, has been ignored where he argued for the interdiction of enemy lines of communication. His theory changes by how the Great War ends with the collapse of the German population's will. Had it ended differently, he could have reached a different conclusion that could have impacted the development of air power theory in the twentieth century.
Most traditional accounts identify the Linebacker I and Linebacker II campaigns as the most effective and consequential uses of U.S. air power in the Vietnam War. They argue that deep interdiction in North Vietnam played a central role in the defeat of the Easter Offensive and that subsequent strategic attacks on Hanoi forced the North Vietnamese to accept the Paris accords. These conclusions are false. The Linebacker campaigns were rather ineffective in either stopping the Communist offensive or compelling concessions. The most effective and consequential use of U.S. air power came in the form of close air support and battlefield air interdiction directly attacking the North Vietnamese Army in South Vietnam. The success of these air strikes hinged on the presence of a U.S.-operated tactical air control system that incorporated small numbers of ground advisers, air liaison officers, and forward air controllers. This system, combined with abundant U.S. aircraft and a reasonably effective allied army, was the key to breaking the Easter Offensive and compelling Hanoi to agree to the Paris accords. The effectiveness of close air support and battlefield air interdiction and the failure of deep interdiction and strategic attack in the Vietnam War have important implications for the use of air power and advisers in contemporary conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan.