Suchergebnisse

"Is economics a science? What distinguishes it from other sciences, both natural and social? Does it have a distinctive method? Can its models of perfect rationality and perfect competition help us to understand real market economies and to help them to function better? This book offers answers to these questions and more."

"This book is about preferences, principally as they figure in economics. It also explores their uses in everyday language and action, how they are understood in psychology and how they figure in philosophical reflection on action and morality. The book clarifies and for the most part defends the way in which economists invoke preferences to explain, predict and assess behavior and outcomes. Hausman argues, however, that the predictions and explanations economists offer rely on theories of preference formation that are in need of further development, and he criticizes attempts to define welfare in terms of preferences and to define preferences in terms of choices or self-interest. The analysis clarifies the relations between rational choice theory and philosophical accounts of human action. The book also assembles the materials out of which models of preference formation and modification can be constructed, and it comments on how reason and emotion shape preferences"--

COVER; HALF-TITLE; TITLE; COPYRIGHT; CONTENTS; INTRODUCTION; An Introduction to Philosophy of Science; Scientific Theories and Laws; Assessment and Demarcation; The Unity of Science; An Introduction to Economics; An Introduction to EconomicMethodology; Notes; PART ONE: CLASSIC DISCUSSIONS; 1 On the Definition and Method of Political Economy; Note; 2 Objectivity and Understanding in Economics; 3 The Nature and Significance of Economic Science; Chapter I: The SubjectMatter of Economics; Chapter IV: The Nature of Economic Generalisations; Chapter V: Economic Generalisations and Reality.

This collection brings together the essays of one of the foremost American philosophers of economics. Cumulatively they offer fresh perspectives on foundational questions such as: what sort of science is economics? and how successful can economists be in acquiring knowledge of their subject matter?

Abstract
Paternalistic nudging and framing aim to correct flaws in deliberation by relying on the same cognitive mechanisms that create those flaws. Regarding some choices as flawed and in need of correction requires some standard of correctness. In their well-known book, Nudge, Thaler and Sunstein take the individual's own "purified" preferences to be that standard, which is inconsistent with the finding of behavioral economics that individuals do not have a stable preference ranking of alternatives, but instead construct their preferences when faced with a choice. This essay defends an alternative, readily usable standard to judge whether individuals are choosing badly and whether nudges can help them to choose better.

AbstractBy identifying well-being with preference satisfaction, mainstream normative economists were able to leave the determination of which specific things make people better or worse off to the individuals themselves. The findings of behavioral economics undermine the possibility of deferring in this way to individual preference. One response to this challenge to welfare economics is to distinguish the true preferences of individuals from their manifest preferences and to take true preferences to guide policy. InThe Community of Advantage, Robert Sugden criticizes this strategy and proposes that economists appraise policies, institutions and outcomes by the opportunities they provide rather than by their contributions to welfare. This paper criticizes Sugden's view and argues for a modest solution that makes cautious use of preferences as indicators of well-being.

Cet article clarifie la nature des relations entre économie positive et économie normative standard. Dès lors que la rationalité peut être caractérisée par la satisfaction de conditions portant sur les choix et les préférences et qu'il est établit que les individus sont approximativement rationnels, il est possible pour les économistes d'utiliser la théorie de la rationalité pour expliquer les choix. S'il s'avère de plus que les individus sont, comme cela est souvent supposé en économie positive, essentiellement égoïstes et raisonnablement informés, alors leurs préférences peuvent être utilisées comme des indicateurs de leur niveau de bien-être. Par conséquent, la modélisation des choix et du bien-être en termes de préférences rationnelles permet d'unifier économie positive et économie normative. En expliquant les résultats du marché par le biais des choix individuels, en expliquant les choix par les préférences, et en supposant que les préférences sont des indicateurs du bien-être, les économistes s'intéressant aux problématiques relatives au bien-être peuvent ainsi développer une théorie normative reposant sur leur théorie positive. Cette approche standard de l'économie normative est confrontée à plusieurs difficultés, mais son unité et son lien avec l'économie positive la rendent également particulièrement attractive.

By structuring choices wisely, governments can get people to make better choices without limiting their freedom.