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In late 2017 the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (P.L. 115-97) was passed into law. Controversy instantly ensued. One major controversy revolves around the capping of the Internal Revenue Code section 164 state and local tax deduction at $10,000 per taxpayer (the SALT cap). Viewed by many blue states as an attack on their citizens, the SALT cap has spurred counterattacks in the form of state legislation designed to provide taxpayers with an avenue to counter the effects of the SALT cap (the SALT cap workarounds). While others have and are considering the effectiveness of the SALT cap workarounds, this essay explores a more basic question: do the states have the power to lob such counterattacks and facilitate taxpayers' federal tax avoidance? The answer is more nuanced than it might first appear; unlike individual tax avoidance actions, the states' actions raise the specter of federal preemption.

Observers of the state and local tax world regularly note the seemingly irresponsible actions so often taken by state revenue agencies, by state courts, and by state legislatures — a few recent examples of states acting badly are set forth below. In many ways federal law has encouraged these types of actions by placing limited checks on the states. The federal Tax Injunction Act (TIA) and the common law comity doctrine keep federal courts off the states' backs. Also, the Supreme Court's South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc. decision and its Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association decision, in which state legislatures were freed from congressional restraints regarding the enactment of state gambling statutes, will likely encourage states to push back on virtually any federal effort in the interstate tax arena. Adding fuel to this fire, most of the states are now, in Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, seeking freedom from another check on their actions, by asking the Supreme Court to overturn precedent allowing state government actors to be sued in sister state courts (this is similar to Massachusetts's efforts in Crutchfield Corp. v. Harding). State victories in these cases would surely fan the flames of unchecked state behavior into a veritable conflagration. There is, however, the glimmer of a fire extinguisher at the end of the tunnel — Congress could establish stronger federal checks on state tax actions by opening the federal courts to interstate taxpayers.

In the United States, many low-income citizens are being held to a harsher standard than wealthier citizens — these low-income citizens are being asked to relinquish their privacy in order to obtain the public assistance they need, whereas wealthier individuals are not subjected to similar levels of public scrutiny for government benefits that they claim. Giving up privacy can have devastating effects on individuals' lives — they may suffer various dignitary harms, may experience repressed abilities to express themselves, and may even be coerced into important life decisions by the government. This situation presents a unique problem to the neediest in our society: they can either give up their privacy in order to receive benefits they are otherwise eligible for, or they can retain their private lives and suffer an economic burden in the amount of the foregone benefits. This choice may not seem outrageous to many in the United States, but it presents a serious issue for our society. Under the current system of public benefits administration, we ask a vulnerable segment of our citizenry to surrender significantly more information about themselves to their communities and to the government than we ask of any other segment, and it is not clear that valid justifications for this system exist. Many have researched the effects of various procedural requirements for receiving various forms of public assistance. This Article follows that research and contrasts the economic effects of those requirements on eligible individuals who forego their benefits with the privacy harms created by those requirements for those who submit to them. Government actors must consider this balance to ensure that the burden we put on those receiving public assistance is fair and efficient. By considering that balance differently — through the lens of taxation — this Article hopes to shed light on a disturbing situation and to help frame the discussion for potential reform.

peer-reviewed ; In all ryegrass breeding programmes it is necessary to select a range of traits within different cultivar types, varying in ploidy and flowering time. The traits selected in ryegrass breeding can be broadly grouped into production traits such as yield, quality and persistency; those seed production traits crucial for delivery of the cultivar, as well as those traits that can benefit the environment, or allow ryegrass to be used for biofuel production. The emphasis placed on each trait will depend on its economic value within the various farming systems where each cultivar will ultimately be used, as well as the potential to make genetic gain in each trait. In all cases multiple trait selection will be required, to develop a cultivar improved for key traits of interest but importantly the cultivar must not have unacceptable performance for any trait. Where the genetic variation is inadequate within perennial ryegrass it may be necessary to enhance ryegrass diversity. In the future this could be achieved through targeted introgression from the closely related Festuca species, or through introduction of genes via genetic modification. Funding of ryegrass breeding internationally will increasingly be subject to the economic success of a few larger seed companies as Government funding for field-based breeding is diminishing and shifting focus to more basic research, often of a molecular nature. Ensuring this expensive basic research and associated molecular technologies are used effectively in ryegrass breeding programmes will remain a challenge when seed companies operating field-based programmes are vulnerable to considerable economic pressure.

Objectives: The mental health legislation of most developed countries includes either a dangerousness criterion or an obligatory dangerousness criterion (ODC). A dangerousness criterion holds that mentally ill people may be given treatment without consent if they are deemed to be a risk to themselves or others. An ODC holds that mentally ill people may be given treatment without consent only if they are deemed to be a risk to themselves or others. This paper argues that the dangerousness criterion is unnecessary, unethical and, in the case of the ODC, potentially harmful to mentally ill people and to the rest of the community. Methods: We examine the history of the dangerousness criterion, and provide reasoned argument and empirical evidence in support of our position. Results: Dangerousness criteria are not required to balance the perceived loss of autonomy arising from mental health legislation. Dangerousness criteria unfairly discriminate against the mentally ill, as they represent an unreasonable barrier to treatment without consent, and they spread the burden of risk that any mentally ill person might become violent across large numbers of mentally ill people who will never become violent. Mental health legislation that includes an ODC is associated with a longer duration of untreated psychosis, and probably contributes to a poorer prognosis and an increase risk of suicide and violence in patients in their first episode of psychosis. Conclusions: Dangerousness criteria should be removed from mental health legislation and be replaced by criteria that focus on a patient's capacity to refuse treatment.

Psychosis is a relatively common and severe mental disorder that results in impaired judgment and reasoning and is associated with an increased incidence of violence in the period before the initiation of treatment. Studies published since the Mental Health Act 1990 (New South Wales) was enacted have shown that the period before the emergence of acute symptoms (the prodrome) and first episode of illness carries a greatly increased risk of violence. It is also established that the longer-term prognosis is improved by early initiation of treatment. We believe the New South Wales Mental Health Act should be amended to reflect the scientific evidence of an increased risk of violence in the early stage of illness and the harm arising from delaying treatment. Emerging psychosis should be regarded as a medical emergency and the threshold for compulsory treatment for people in the early phase of psychotic illness should be lower.