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This article investigates the extent to which people link policy preferences with unequal outcomes. As the American public is both aware and supportive of reducing income inequality in the abstract, it is an open question whether this concern is translated into support for policies that might help alleviate the rise in economic inequality. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used with data from the General Social Survey (GSS). The relationship between attitudes about wealth inequality and spending preferences is positive, but not strong. Moreover, there is no evidence that the least well-off are more attuned to linking attitudes about inequality with spending preferences than the upper or middle classes. The main findings suggest that while citizens are able to link attitudes about inequality with spending preferences, the link might not be strong enough to propel elected officials to act as wealth inequality expands. Adapted from the source document.

ObjectivesThis article investigates the extent to which people link policy preferences with unequal outcomes. As the American public is both aware and supportive of reducing income inequality in the abstract, it is an open question whether this concern is translated into support for policies that might help alleviate the rise in economic inequality.MethodsOrdinary least squares (OLS) regression is used with data from the General Social Survey (GSS).ResultsThe relationship between attitudes about wealth inequality and spending preferences is positive, but not strong. Moreover, there is no evidence that the least well‐off are more attuned to linking attitudes about inequality with spending preferences than the upper or middle classes.ConclusionThe main findings suggest that while citizens are able to link attitudes about inequality with spending preferences, the link might not be strong enough to propel elected officials to act as wealth inequality expands.

To what extent do members of Congress respond unequally to people in different economic situations? How does partisan control of the agenda change the way in which Senators respond to the poor? Using data from the 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey, and multiple roll call votes, I examine Senate responsiveness for the 107th through 111th Congresses. The results show consistent responsiveness toward upper income constituents. Moreover, Republicans are more responsive than Democrats to middle-income constituents in the 109th Congress, and a case study of the 107th Senate reveals that responsiveness toward the wealthy increases once Democrats take control of the chamber. Adapted from the source document.

To what extent do members of Congress respond unequally to people in different economic situations? How does partisan control of the agenda change the way in which Senators respond to the poor? Using data from the 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey, and multiple roll call votes, I examine Senate responsiveness for the 107th through 111th Congresses. The results show consistent responsiveness toward upper income constituents. Moreover, Republicans are more responsive than Democrats to middle-income constituents in the 109th Congress, and a case study of the 107th Senate reveals that responsiveness toward the wealthy increases once Democrats take control of the chamber.

To what extent do members of Congress respond unequally to people in different economic situations? How does partisan control of the agenda change the way in which Senators respond to the poor? Using data from the 2004 National Annenberg Election Study (NAES), and multiple roll call votes, I examine Senate responsiveness across a range of issues for the 107th through 111th Congresses. Additionally, I use the 107th Congress as a case study to test responsiveness under changes in agenda control. This paper has three important findings. First, I find extreme biases in responsiveness to constituents in different economic groups, with more wealthy individuals receiving the highest level of representation, while poorer groups seem to be either ignored, or have legislators act in opposition to their preferences. Second, the major political parties seemed to have recently switched roles as the Democratic Party has become responsive to the wealthy, while Republicans are responsive to the middle-class. Third, partisan control of the agenda does impact the way in which different groups receive representation as Democratic control of the Senate tends to lead to increased responsiveness toward the middle class. The findings in this paper are suggestive of broader factors at play in terms of the representation of different income groups, subconstituency politics, and the policies aimed at reducing economic inequality in the United States.

Among the main tenets of American democracy are liberty, popular sovereignty, and equality. While each has seen expansion over the course of American history, the recent growth in economic inequality could threaten each of these core democratic features. As political equality is a prerequisite central to each of these values, I investigate the question: where does political inequality come from? In order to research the sources of political inequality, I examine the nature of inequality in each of three aspects of the American governmental system: institutions (e.g. Congress), individuals (e.g. voters), and theinteraction between the two (e.g. responsiveness).At its founding, the American government was set up to be a republican democracy. In this light, I focus on the role of representation in the U.S. political system and the degreeto which certain groups receive higher levels of responsiveness, defined as the level of correspondence between constituency preferences and a legislator's behavior (e.g. Miller andStokes 1963; Achen 1978), and other groups do not. Because modern democratic theory assumes the continued responsiveness of the government to all citizens (considered aspolitical equals) my primary focus is to examine the degree to which this equal responsiveness is broken, which can be a source of political inequality (Dahl 1971). The argument that I make throughout the dissertation is that economic inequality greatly affectspolitical inequality. While this thesis may not seem novel, recent studies that have uncovered evidence of unequal governmental responsiveness have been unable to provide an accountof why this occurs (Gilens 2005; Bartels 2008).In the dissertation I explore three questions. First, how pervasive is political inequality? In order to answer this question I examine the behavior of members of Congress and the degree to which they respond to different economic classes. As Congress is themain body designed to represent the people's voice, I focus intensely on this institution.The second question, which focuses on the role of the people, is: Does the public view inequality as a problem? In researching this question, I will examine individual preferencesfrom the mass public in order to understand people's attitudes toward inequality. Individual indifference to economic inequality and an inability to hold elected officials accountable could be a main source of political inequality. Finally, I examine the interaction between individual (and group) preferences and political institutions and ask the question: What accounts for legislator bias toward different groups? To this end, I examine the influenceson legislator behavior such as member personal wealth, party, competitiveness, constituent preference (majority and subconstituency), constituent participatory factors (e.g. voting,volunteering, donating, etc.), and political knowledge.

This article examines the relationship between income concentration and policy outputs that determine the generosity of two major state-level safety net programs: unemployment insurance and cash social assistance. Using a difference in differences framework, it tests the degree to which the top 1 percent share is associated with benefit replacement rates for these programs during the period 1978–2010. The results suggest that higher state income inequality lowers those states' welfare benefits significantly in ways consistent with a "plutocracy" hypothesis that has been suggested in work by scholars such as Bartels, Bonica, Gilens, and Page. The results are robust to controls for several alternative explanations for benefit generosity, including citizen ideology, party control of government, fiscal pressure on programs, state racial heterogeneity, and public opinion liberalism. The results thus support the notion that growing income concentration at the very top undermines social protection policies.

This article examines the factors that influence two important areas of state tax policy—the adoption of an income tax as well as whether a state permits deducting federal income taxes against state individual income taxes. We focus on a factor that has largely been unexplored, the flow of income going to the Top 1% of earners. Using data from two different time periods (1916-1937 and 1960-2003), we find that the share of income received by the richest 1% of taxpayers corresponds with both the likelihood states will adopt an income tax as well as whether states allow deductions of federal income tax against state individual income taxes.