Suchergebnisse

Dr Peng He in her book addresses various issues, drawing on Western and Chinese sources for her argument for a 'communicative' theory of law making. This book is both timely and important in the Chinese context. Her argument depends upon the insight that what is important in societies is not just representative democracy but 'voice' - the opportunity for individuals to be heard and bring their input into official systems. More than that, she argues that this can also take further the idea of living by the rules as something that is not to be seen as narrow Legalism but as something more akin to living 'righteously' - a view which is resonant with parts of Chinese legal thought. This book is also important in the present Chinese context in another way. The developing economy necessitates substantial legal reform. But applying Western models to China can often be naïve and not fully fulfil their intended purpose. Peng He's work addresses this by looking at the process of legislation in connection with legal reform. It is grounded in a sound theoretical reflection of both the process of legal transplantation and the process of law making, and looks both at Western and Chinese sources. Such an approach needs to draw from several intellectual traditions and it is this interdisciplinary, foundational research that is the task Dr He has set herself in her project. Her theory will provide an abstract theoretical framework that is sensitive to local conditions, while at the same time incorporating insights on law reform from a broad range of disciplines. Her research is of direct practical relevance for reforming the legislative process in China. -- Professor Zenon Bańkowski The University of Edinburgh

Purpose– The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between job- and organization-based psychological ownership. In addition, the authors explored the emergence and outcomes of psychological ownership in Chinese context.Design/methodology/approach– Time-lagged survey data from 158 Chinese participants were used to test several hypothesized relationships employing partial least square techniques.Findings– Job-based psychological ownership appeared to mediate the relationship between experienced job control and organization-based psychological ownership. In addition, a statistically significant relationship between job-based psychological ownership and job satisfaction, organizational citizenship behaviors and turnover intentions, and a statistically significant relationship between organization-based psychological ownership and job satisfaction were observed. A negative relationship between organization-based psychological ownership and knowledge withholding was also observed.Practical implications– Managers who want to enhance employees' job- and ultimately organization-based psychological ownership should empower their employees by enabling them to exert control over their work.Originality/value– This paper examined how organization-based psychological ownership emerges from control over work via job-based psychological ownership. The authors also investigated the impact of psychological ownership in Chinese context.

Government supervision and media investigation play an important role in regulating manufacturing produce mode and reducing carbon emissions. In terms of theoretical implications, this study uses the tripartite evolutionary game model to investigate the dynamic decision-making process of stable strategies among three participating stakeholders: manufacturing enterprises, government regulatory departments, and media survey agencies. The payoff matrix and replicator dynamic functions of three parties are specifically calculated based on the evolutionary game theory. From a lower-carbon economy perspective, the main factors (revenue, subsidy, cost, and loss) that affect the stable strategies of three stakeholders are included in the sensitivity analysis. In terms of practical implications, this paper describes the evolutionary dynamic process of the stability condition using numerical simulation tests, and it proposes the promotion mechanism of four different supervision stages of manufacturing production mode. In the beginning and early stage, strengthened government supervision and active media investigation have a positive effect on reducing the heavy-polluting manufacturer proportion in China. Under this circumstance, the lower cost, in-creased revenue, and added subsidies all motivate firms to adopt the lower-carbon production mode. With the maturity of the supervision platform, public media will gradually reduce their investigations and interventions to the manufacturing business, and finally engage in no-investigation. This paper also demonstrates that lower penalties and subsidies are not related to the optimal strategy among three stakeholders, and the extravagant survey cost will reduce the enthusiasm of public media to investigate manufacturing firms.

PurposeAlthough studies have demonstrated that knowledge hiding is an important inhibitor of organizational innovation, current research does not clearly address how intragroup relationship conflict influences knowledge hiding. This study aims to identify the underlying mechanism between intra-group relationship conflict and knowledge hiding.Design/methodology/approachDrawing on affective events theory (AET), the authors propose a theoretical model and empirically test it by applying hierarchical regression analysis and a bootstrapping approach to data from a multi-wave survey of 224 employees in China.FindingsConsistent with AET, the empirical results show that envy mediates perceived intragroup relationship conflict and knowledge hiding. As predicted, trait competitiveness moderates the indirect effect of perceived intragroup relationship conflict on knowledge hiding via envy.Originality/valueThe results support an AET perspective whereby knowledge hiding is shaped by relationship conflict, envy and trait competitiveness. This study introduces the novel proposition that relationship conflict and competitiveness influence envy, and consequently knowledge hiding.

This paper aims to explore an effective green incentive mechanism for government to develop traditional tourism into green tourism by establishing a dynamic evolutionary game model among governments, tourism enterprises, and tourists. We first discuss the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) regarding green innovation and its corresponding conditions for each stakeholder, and then analyze the ESS between tourism enterprises and tourists, with and without consideration of government green supervision. The optimal green incentive condition for driving all stakeholders to conduct green behavior is identified. More importantly, we advise the government to first implement green incentive mechanism in the areas where the tourism market scale is relatively small. Additionally, we utilize numerical examples to illustrate the findings and provide some managerial insights.

Global hubs of STI are strategic nodes in the global science network and will lead the future of global scientific progress. This paper takes big data analysis and mining technology as an example, exploring the structures and characteristics of global science network of 15 representative global hubs of STI from 2000 to 2019. Based on the data of highly cited papers and methods of social network analysis, we find that the global science network has the structure of hierarchy, with an obvious characteristic of regionality. Based on the structures and characteristics of global science network, the knowledge flow and management model of global hubs has been proposed, which may be conducive to strengthening the knowledge management and network collaboration among global hubs of STI in other frontier technologies.

In this article, we investigate two competitive tour operators (TOs) who choose between traditional tourism strategy (strategy T) and green tourism innovation strategy (strategy G). Our article attempts to address the following important issues using evolutionary game models: when would TOs facing environment-friendly tourists adopt the strategy G? How do TOs set product prices under different strategy combinations? How can the government effectively motivate TOs to pursue green tourism? Our research results show that a green tourism innovation pioneer could monopolize the market under certain conditions. Furthermore, when the environmental preference of tourists is sufficiently low, no TOs would adopt the strategy G; when it is moderate, only the TO with cost advantage (stronger TO) would adopt the strategy G; when it is sufficiently high, both TOs would select the strategy G. Our research also demonstrates that the stronger TO implements the strategy G mostly independent of the rival's decisions, but the opposite is true for the TO with cost disadvantage (weaker TO). We further investigate potential government subsidies that can motivate TOs to carry out green tourism simultaneously. Our results suggest that to be more effective, the government first offer the green subsidy to highly competitive tourism locations and/or more innovative TOs.

In this article, we investigate two competitive tour operators (TOs) who choose between traditional tourism strategy (strategy T) and green tourism innovation strategy (strategy G). Our article attempts to address the following important issues using evolutionary game models: when would TOs facing environment-friendly tourists adopt the strategy G? How do TOs set product prices under different strategy combinations? How can the government effectively motivate TOs to pursue green tourism? Our research results show that a green tourism innovation pioneer could monopolize the market under certain conditions. Furthermore, when the environmental preference of tourists is sufficiently low, no TOs would adopt the strategy G; when it is moderate, only the TO with cost advantage (stronger TO) would adopt the strategy G; when it is sufficiently high, both TOs would select the strategy G. Our research also demonstrates that the stronger TO implements the strategy G mostly independent of the rival's decisions, but the opposite is true for the TO with cost disadvantage (weaker TO). We further investigate potential government subsidies that can motivate TOs to carry out green tourism simultaneously. Our results suggest that to be more effective, the government first offer the green subsidy to highly competitive tourism locations and/or more innovative TOs