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AbstractDeindustrialization in the sense of a decline in the share of industry in GDP, generally observed in developed countries, is explained by the three‐sector model. While this model shows a 'normal' level of deindustrialization, this study proposes to use unbalanced trade to assess the existence of undue deindustrialization in 21 major developed countries and empirically confirms its existence. At finer sectoral levels, by grouping these countries into Europ16 and Pacific5, the direct and indirect impacts of trade on these countries over the period 1991–2018 are assessed. The results suggest that Pacific5 was more affected than Europ16 and that China exerted stronger trade effects in causing this undue decline than nine other emerging Asian countries combined.

International audience ; With the guidance of a framework of new institutional economics, the theoretical modelling establishes the necessary and sufficient conditions for institutional change to occur in authoritarian regimes: first, external shocks must be strong, much stronger than in a democratic regime; second, the shocks must be of such a kind that gives rise to factional competition within the ruling group. It predicts that involvement by the ruled group brings about more extensive institutional change than that merely driven by the ruling group. The theory is then applied to explain rural China's market transition. As institutional change defines payoff structure, the extent of this change is approximated by the income advantage of cadre households relative to noncadre households. Econometric tests based on a Chinese rural household panel data of 21 years confirm the theoretical prediction.

International audience ; With the guidance of a framework of new institutional economics, the theoretical modelling establishes the necessary and sufficient conditions for institutional change to occur in authoritarian regimes: first, external shocks must be strong, much stronger than in a democratic regime; second, the shocks must be of such a kind that gives rise to factional competition within the ruling group. It predicts that involvement by the ruled group brings about more extensive institutional change than that merely driven by the ruling group. The theory is then applied to explain rural China's market transition. As institutional change defines payoff structure, the extent of this change is approximated by the income advantage of cadre households relative to noncadre households. Econometric tests based on a Chinese rural household panel data of 21 years confirm the theoretical prediction.

International audience ; With the guidance of a framework of new institutional economics, the theoretical modelling establishes the necessary and sufficient conditions for institutional change to occur in authoritarian regimes: first, external shocks must be strong, much stronger than in a democratic regime; second, the shocks must be of such a kind that gives rise to factional competition within the ruling group. It predicts that involvement by the ruled group brings about more extensive institutional change than that merely driven by the ruling group. The theory is then applied to explain rural China's market transition. As institutional change defines payoff structure, the extent of this change is approximated by the income advantage of cadre households relative to noncadre households. Econometric tests based on a Chinese rural household panel data of 21 years confirm the theoretical prediction.

AbstractConsidering a supply chain with a supplier subject to yield uncertainty selling to a retailer facing stochastic demand, we find that commonly studied classical coordination contracts fail to coordinate both the supplier's production and the retailer's procurement decisions and achieve efficient performance. First, we study the vendor managed inventory (VMI) partnership. We find that a consignment VMI partnership coupled with a production cost subsidy achieves perfect coordination and a win‐win outcome; it is simple to implement and arbitrarily allocates total channel profit. The production cost subsidy optimally chosen through Nash bargaining analysis depends on the bargaining power of the supplier and the retailer. Further, motivated by the practice that sometimes the retailer and the supplier can arrange a "late order," we also analyze the behavior of an advance‐purchase discount (APD) contract. We find that an APD with a revenue sharing contract can efficiently coordinate the supply chain as well as achieve flexible profit allocation. Finally, we explore which coordination contract works better for the supplier vs. the retailer. It is interesting to observe that Nash bargaining solutions for the two coordination contracts are equivalent. We further provide recommendations on the applications of these contracts. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 305–319, 2016

15 p. ; Dans cette communication, nous explorons la question des moyens et des méthodes mises en oeuvre par l'Etat Central chinois afin de positionner la nation parmi les leaders mondiaux de l'innovation. A cet effet, au côté de l'impulsion d'une ambitieuse politique de recherche scientifique, l'acteur public a décidé de retenir la voie de l'agglomération d'investissements directs étrangers au sein de clusters à haut contenu technologique. Aujourd'hui, la Chine représente ainsi le 1er pays mondial en nombre et en importance de clusters développés sur le territoire. Derrière la question de l'ampleur de ce phénomène en Chine, véritable cas d'école d'une politique ambitieuse de cluster pilotée par l'Etat Central, quelles sont réellement les portées et limites rencontrées dans l'affichage de cette politique volontariste de développement territorialisé d'activités à haut contenu technologique ? Notre recherche nous conduit alors à mettre en évidence des résultats contrastés de cette voie chinoise.

15 p. ; Dans cette communication, nous explorons la question des moyens et des méthodes mises en oeuvre par l'Etat Central chinois afin de positionner la nation parmi les leaders mondiaux de l'innovation. A cet effet, au côté de l'impulsion d'une ambitieuse politique de recherche scientifique, l'acteur public a décidé de retenir la voie de l'agglomération d'investissements directs étrangers au sein de clusters à haut contenu technologique. Aujourd'hui, la Chine représente ainsi le 1er pays mondial en nombre et en importance de clusters développés sur le territoire. Derrière la question de l'ampleur de ce phénomène en Chine, véritable cas d'école d'une politique ambitieuse de cluster pilotée par l'Etat Central, quelles sont réellement les portées et limites rencontrées dans l'affichage de cette politique volontariste de développement territorialisé d'activités à haut contenu technologique ? Notre recherche nous conduit alors à mettre en évidence des résultats contrastés de cette voie chinoise.