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Artificial Intelligence (AI) is beneficial in many respects, but also has harmful effects that constitute risks for individuals and society. Dealing with AI risks is a future-oriented endeavor that needs to be approached in a forward-looking way. Forward-looking responsibility is about who should do what to remedy or prevent harm. With the ongoing EU policy process on AI development as a point of departure, the purpose of this article is to discuss distribution of forward-looking responsibility for AI development with respect to what the obligations entail in terms of burdens or assets for the responsible agents and for the development of AI. The analysis builds on the documents produced in the course of the EU process, with a particular focus on the early role of the European Parliament, the work of the High-Level Expert Group on AI, and the Commission's proposal for a regulation of AI, and problematises effects of forward-looking responsibility for the agents who are attributed forward-looking responsibility and for the development of AI. Three issues were studied: ethics by design, Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), and competition. Overall, the analysis of the EU policy process on AI shows that competition is the primary value, and that the perspective is technical and focused on short-term concerns. As for ethics by design, the question of which values should be built into the technology and how this should be settled remained an issue after the distribution of responsibility to designers and other technical experts. AGI never really was an issue in this policy process, and it was gradually phased out. Competition within the EU process on AI is a norm that frames how responsibility is approached, and gives rise to potential value conflicts.

This dissertation is about expert influence and democracy and focuses on how political decision-making about issues highly dependent on qualified scientific expertise should come about in order to be democratic. The primary purpose of the study is to evaluate, from a democratic perspective, the Swedish legislative process concerned with medical gene technology ? an archetypal case where the decision-making processes involve a marked level of expertise. It is argued that a democratic decision-making process should be characterized by openness and transparency and the possibility for a variety of standpoints to be visible and open to debate. This democratic norm is valid for all decision-making processes and the crucial question is whether a decision-making process highly dependent on qualified scientific expertise would have difficulties meeting such posed democratic criteria. The author makes a systematic empirical and normative analysis of the decision-making process in question, which is anatomised and evaluated against the democratic norm. The overall result of the study is that scientific experts have been able to define the problems on the political agenda and, thereby, had influenced the process as a whole. However, this has not constrained a variety of standpoints to be visible, but views expressed about the experts? problem definitions have prompted more frequent responses from the political decision-makers than other views, which only occasionally have been responded to. The Swedish legislative process concerned with medical gene technology has thereby partly deviated from democratic ideals.

Albert O. Hirschman has observed a specific pattern of reactions against any attempt to change society. According to Hirschman, the rhetoric of reaction is limited to three alternatives -- perversity, futility, or jeopardy -- that will be the unintended & unavoidable effects of attempts to make changes in society. Therefore, say the so-called reactionaries, changes should not be realized. The objective of this study is to test the validity of the theory of Albert O. Hirschman. This is made by a case study of the media reaction of the call of the Attac movement for a currency transaction tax, the so-called Tobin tax. The study comprises an argument analysis of the editorial pages of five Swedish newspapers during the first three months of 2001, selected to represent main political & geographical dimensions: Aftonbladet, Dala-Demokraten, Dagens Nyheter, Svenska Dagbladet, & Vasterbottens-Kuriren. The result of the study is that all of the arguments are against the Tobin tax & that most of them follow the pattern of perversity, futility, or jeopardy. Arguments that do not follow either of these patterns are irrelevant or marginal. The study gives no support to questioning the reaction theory of Albert O. Hirschman. 3 Tables, 3 Figures, 2 Appendixes, 105 References. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractArtificial intelligence (AI) is becoming increasingly influential in most people's lives. This raises many philosophical questions. One is what responsibility we have as individuals to guide the development of AI in a desirable direction. More specifically, how should this responsibility be distributed among individuals and between individuals and other actors? We investigate this question from the perspectives of five principles of distribution that dominate the discussion about responsibility in connection with climate change: effectiveness, equality, desert, need, and ability. Since much is already written about these distributions in that context, we believe much can be gained if we can make use of this discussion also in connection with AI. Our most important findings are: (1) Different principles give different answers depending on how they are interpreted but, in many cases, different interpretations and different principles agree and even strengthen each other. If for instance 'equality-based distribution' is interpreted in a consequentialist sense, effectiveness, and through it, ability, will play important roles in the actual distributions, but so will an equal distribution as such, since we foresee that an increased responsibility of underrepresented groups will make the risks and benefits of AI more equally distributed. The corresponding reasoning is true for need-based distribution. (2) If we acknowledge that someone has a certain responsibility, we also have to acknowledge a corresponding degree of influence for that someone over the matter in question. (3) Independently of which distribution principle we prefer, ability cannot be dismissed. Ability is not fixed, however and if one of the other distributions is morally required, we are also morally required to increase the ability of those less able to take on the required responsibility.

Current developments in genetics and genomics entail a number of changes and challenges for society as new knowledge and technology become common in the clinical setting and in society at large. The relationship between genetics and ethics has been much discussed during the last decade, while the relationship between genetics and the political arena—with terms such as rights, distribution, expertise, participation and democracy—has been less considered. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate the connection between genetics and democracy. In order to do this, we delineate a notion of democracy that incorporates process as well as substance values. On the basis of this notion of democracy and on claims of democratisation in the science and technology literature, we argue for the importance of considering genetic issues in a democratic manner. Having established this connection between genetics and democracy, we discuss this relation in three different contexts where the relationship between genetics and democracy becomes truly salient: the role of expertise, science and public participation, and individual responsibility and distributive justice. As developments within genetics and genomics advance with great speed, the importance and use of genetic knowledge within society can be expected to grow. However, this expanding societal importance of genetics might ultimately involve, interact with, or even confront important aspects within democratic rule and democratic decision-making. Moreover, we argue that the societal importance of genetic development makes it crucial to consider not only decision-making processes, but also the policy outcomes of these processes. This argument supports our process and substance notion of democracy, which implies that public participation, as a process value, must be complemented with a focus on the effects of policy decisions on democratic values such as distributive justice.

Current developments in genetics and genomics entail a number of changes and challenges for society as new knowledge and technology become common in the clinical setting and in society at large. The relationship between genetics and ethics has been much discussed during the last decade, while the relationship between genetics and the political arena-with terms such as rights, distribution, expertise, participation and democracy-has been less considered. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate the connection between genetics and democracy. In order to do this, we delineate a notion of democracy that incorporates process as well as substance values. On the basis of this notion of democracy and on claims of democratisation in the science and technology literature, we argue for the importance of considering genetic issues in a democratic manner. Having established this connection between genetics and democracy, we discuss this relation in three different contexts where the relationship between genetics and democracy becomes truly salient: the role of expertise, science and public participation, and individual responsibility and distributive justice. As developments within genetics and genomics advance with great speed, the importance and use of genetic knowledge within society can be expected to grow. However, this expanding societal importance of genetics might ultimately involve, interact with, or even confront important aspects within democratic rule and democratic decision-making. Moreover, we argue that the societal importance of genetic development makes it crucial to consider not only decision-making processes, but also the policy outcomes of these processes. This argument supports our process and substance notion of democracy, which implies that public participation, as a process value, must be complemented with a focus on the effects of policy decisions on democratic values such as distributive justice.