"A comprehensive analysis of strategic cooperation in authoritarian regimes, specifically focusing on Yemen's Joint Meeting Parties-an alliance composed of diverse Islamist, Socialist, and Arab nationalist parties, this book is a case study that explores the alliance's remarkable longevity and ultimate success, shedding light on the reasons behind the emergence and endurance of opposition cooperation in autocracies"--
AbstractThis article assesses Saudi Arabia's ambivalent response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. On the one hand, the Kingdom has publicly condemned Russia's military aggression as contravening international law. Yet, on the other, it has also failed to take serious measures against Moscow, notably by refusing to join in Western attempts to prevent Russia from earning hydrocarbon revenues on the international market. Saudi Arabia has adopted a neutral position instead, offering to mediate between the warring parties while simultaneously repeatedly rebuffing its longtime ally the United States. By reviewing the Kingdom's foreign policy moves and narratives since the war's onset, it is argued Saudi officials are acting perfectly rationally in that they strive to achieve the optimum outcome as per their definition of Saudi national interests in this conflict, thereby pressing ahead with the diversification of Saudi foreign policy initiated roughly one decade earlier. In concluding, the implications of the Kingdom's stance on the war for future global order‐making are discussed.
AbstractIn light of recent Saudi Arabian foreign policy, this article examines the valorization of public diplomacy in regional leadership struggles—a widely neglected topic in discussion on regional powers. Concentrating on regions with distinct power hierarchies, the literature offers nuanced explanations for how already-established regional leaders seek to maintain their position but only limited discussion of how ambitious states seek to assume leadership in the first place. The proposed binary set of coercive and persuasive strategies used by aspirant leaders does not capture the complexities of these regional leadership struggles. This article argues instead that aspirant leaders lacking the power assets to exclusively embark on either strategy become prone to resorting to a strategy mix combining elements of both coercion and persuasion. Because of the inconsistencies arising from applying such antithetical policies, however, public diplomacy significantly gains in importance as a magnifying and balancing tool amid this strategy mix.
Africa has experienced an unprecedented level of involvement in its regional affairs by Middle Eastern states in the past few years. This is a remarkable development, indeed, given that transregional relations have been characterized by reciprocal ignorance for most of the post‐World War II period. The scope of these current transregional entanglements can be best observed along the African coast bordering the Red Sea. Middle Eastern states have facilitated peace talks in, for instance, Sudan (Qatar, 2008–2011), and Somalia (Saudi Arabia, 2007; Turkey, since 2011), as well as between Djibouti and Eritrea (Qatar, 2010–2017). More recently, concerted mediation efforts by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia have led to an agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia - ending, finally, their 20-year war in September 2018 - and stimulated fresh negotiations between Djibouti and Eritrea. New talks have also been facilitated regarding the three-way conflict among Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan over sharing the Nile waters. However, recent Middle Eastern spats have also left the Horn of Africa facing security-related repercussions. The intra-Gulf crisis pitting Saudi Arabia and the UAE against Qatar and Turkey has reverberated to such an extent that the African Union discussed the spillover in January 2018. And while the recent diplomatic breakthrough between Eritrea and Ethiopia has been widely praised as an important step toward regional stabilization, observers also caution that Middle Eastern geopolitical rivalries could "provoke destabilizing reactions across the Horn of Africa." This is even more true as the Red Sea has experienced notable militarization of late. Besides the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which have already established military bases in the region or are planning to do so, Middle Eastern states are also emerging as regional military players. Egypt, Iran, Israel and Qatar obviously have a stake in these developments, while Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the UAE, which seem bent on becoming key actors in the Greater Horn, are constructing a series of military bases from Sudan to Somalia. The debates about the militarization of the Red Sea obscure, however, the fact that Africa as a whole has become a region of vital interest to these and other Middle Eastern states, each of them with its own history of relations there. While prospective economic benefits and international prestige have long dominated the agenda, present-day dynamics are heavily driven by the struggle for hegemony in the Middle East. This article focuses on the policies of Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, the dominant regional powers at the center of the hegemonic competition. On the one hand, their turn to Africa indicates that their foreign policies have become more assertive on the international stage, especially regarding South-South relations. On the other, their current strategic approaches and their politics of alliance building follow very closely the logic of conflict dynamics in their home region.
In: Informationsprojekt Naher und Mittlerer Osten: INAMO ; Berichte & Analysen zu Politik und Gesellschaft des Nahen und Mittleren Ostens, Band 23, Heft 90, S. 3
The crafting of South Yemen's political future is a core issue in Yemen's multilevel conflict. A central role in that process is played by the Southern Transitional Council (al-Majlis al-Intiqali al-Janubi; hereafter, STC), an entity that is increasingly perceived internationally as the representative of South Yemeni interests. While this role is in keeping with the STC's own mandate, it is not approved of by all of the many rival actors involved. The STC was founded in 2017 with the aim of leading the territories of the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen to independence. Such calls for secession have long been popular with large parts of the population, but have gained new momentum since the onset of civil war in 2014. Reshaping the relationship between North and South has been central to a comprehensive conflict settlement in Yemen, and not just since the STC was founded. The STC claims to represent the interests of the South and to provide its political leadership. It sees itself at the forefront of the heterogeneous Southern Movement, which has endured numerous internal conflicts since its emergence in 2007 and has not yet been able to agree on a common leadership structure. Thus, the STC is neither the only political interest group of the South nor is its claim to leadership acknowledged and approved of by all organisations of the Southern Movement. The fact that the STC is currently the dominant organisation in the Southern Movement is largely due to the support of the United Arab Emirates. As a result, the future leadership position of the STC, as well as its agency, are highly dependent on the interests of Abu Dhabi. Given the importance of the Southern issue in future peace negotiations in Yemen, it is necessary to take into account the range of key actors in South Yemen and to understand their relationship with each other. The European Union should continue to press for an understanding among these actors and support them in developing a common bargaining position.
The recent endeavours of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey in the Horn of Africa have raised fears that the Middle Eastern struggle for hegemony will be repeated in a region of vast geostrategic importance. Yet these countries' interest in Africa is neither new nor limited to the Horn. To anticipate the impact of their contest for influence in Africa, it is key to understand the preferences underlying their efforts. The upgrading of relations between Middle Eastern powers and African states dates back several decades. Iran intensified relations with African states as a result of the sanctions imposed on the regime following the Islamic Revolution. Turkey's Africa policy gained momentum with the Justice and Development Party's rise to power. Saudi Arabia established initial contacts with African states in the wake of the 1967 Arab–Israeli War but only recently rediscovered its strategic interest in the continent. While their Africa policies have also been driven by particular interests, Ankara, Riyadh, and Tehran have long been primarily interested in prospective economic gains on the one hand and the continent's potential as a source of international allies on the other. Unlike the case in past periods of recurring strategic neglect, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey today view Africa as a region of considerable importance for the achievement of their political objectives in and beyond the Middle East. Their competition for influence in the Horn of Africa and the increasing militarisation of the Red Sea are just two of the most visible indications of this. The policies of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey will have significant effects on events in Africa and contradict the aims of the EU's foreign policies in many respects, particularly in terms of security and migration. The EU should also be aware that these states are presenting themselves as a viable alternative to it and should thus seek to further mend its strained relationships with African partners.