The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
In: Service monographs of the United States government 38
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In: Service monographs of the United States government 38
In: University of Missouri studies 17,1
In: American political science review, Band 26, Heft 3, S. 452-469
ISSN: 1537-5943
The term "majority rule" is as impossible to escape as it is apparently difficult to define with precision. Aristotle generally employed it to designate the conduct of government by the poor citizens, who were more numerous than the rich, in the Greek city states. In canon law, it meant the verdict of the maior and sanior pars of a small group. Frederic Harrison wrote about the "rule" of the "effective majority"—that section of any community or social aggregate, which, for the matter in hand, practically outweighs the remainder. He explains that it may do so "by virtue of its preponderance in numbers, or in influence, or in force of conviction, or in external resources, or in many other ways." Sir George Cornewall Lewis thought that where the ultimate decision is vested in a body there is no alternative other than to count numbers, and to abide by the opinion of a majority. But in alleging that "no historian, in discussing the justice or propriety of any decision of a legislative body, or of a court of justice, thinks of defending the decision of the majority by saying that it was the decision of the majority," he did not anticipate the view of the English historian Hearnshaw. According to the latter, "The faith of a democrat requires him to believe that in the long run the majority of the people finds its way to the truth, and that in the long run it tries to do the right."
In: American political science review, Band 20, Heft 1, S. 52-68
ISSN: 1537-5943
Perhaps no convention of our day is more acceptable to both the political scientist and the man on the street than the employment of the simple-majority device to determine the will of a group. Even the ponderous German scholar Otto von Gierke is drawn to the facetious conclusion that it is only in the institution of matrimony that the majority principle cannot be used. Exceptions, of course, exist. Examples familiar to students of American government include the two-thirds and three-fourths majorities of the federal amending process, the two-thirds vote of the United States Senate in the approval of treaties, and like majorities in the overriding of presidential and gubernatorial vetoes. But these exceptions do not invalidate the commonly accepted "naturalness" of decisions according to simple majority. The theory has probably been expressed best by Grotius: "It is unnatural," he says, "that the majority should submit to the minority—hence the majority naturally counts as the whole, if no compacts or positive law prescribe a different form of procedure."Although it now finds almost universal acceptance, the practice of reaching decisions by counting heads has not always prevailed, and even where employed its use has been limited and contingent. Speaking historically, the modern dogma of majority rule is a comparatively recent development, although it is probably an outgrowth of the various theories of majority rule of days gone.