Suchergebnisse

Game plan -- Mountains are mountains: roots of everyday stress -- Introduction: applying Zen -- Zen and professional leadership -- The power of Zen -- Mountains are not mountains: transforming conflict into encounter -- Everybody must get foxed -- The greater the doubt, the greater the enlightenment -- Seeing the forest, but not missing the trees -- Mountains are mountains, again: from structure to anti-structure -- Returning to the marketplace -- All's well that ends well -- Coming from nowhere to somewhere -- Glossary -- Appendix: Koan translation ("Te-shan carrying his bundle").

"Cultural Psychology is a textbook by Steve Heine, professor of Psychology at the University of British Columbia, intended for use in Cultural Psychology university courses. The most contemporary and relevant introduction to the field, Cultural Psychology 4e is unmatched in both its presentation of current, global experimental research and its focus on helping students to think like cultural psychologists"--

This paper introduces the notion of genetic essentialist biases: cognitive biases associated with essentialist thinking that are elicited when people encounter arguments that genes are relevant for a behavior, condition, or social group. Learning about genetic attributions for various human conditions leads to a particular set of thoughts regarding those conditions: they are more likely to be perceived as a) immutable and determined, b) having a specific etiology, c) homogeneous and discrete, and, d) natural, which can lead to the naturalistic fallacy. There are rare cases of "strong genetic explanation" when such responses to genetic attributions may be appropriate, however people tend to over-weigh genetic attributions compared with competing attributions even in cases of "weak genetic explanation," which are far more common. Research on people's understanding of race, gender, sexual orientation, criminality, mental illness and obesity is reviewed through a genetic essentialism lens, highlighting attitudinal, cognitive and behavioral changes that stem from consideration of genetic attributions as bases of these categories. Scientists and media portrayals of genetic discoveries are discussed with respect to genetic essentialism, as is the role that genetic essentialism has played (and continues to play) in various public policies, legislation, scientific endeavors, and ideological movements in recent history. Last, moderating factors and interventions to reduce the magnitude of genetic essentialism are discussed that identify promising directions to explore in order to reduce these biases.

Behavioral scientists routinely publish broad claims about human psychology and behavior in the world's top journals based on samples drawn entirely from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic (WEIRD) societies. Researchers-often implicitly-assume that either there is little variation across human populations, or that these 'standard subjects' are as representative of the species as any other population. Are these assumptions justified? Here, our review of the comparative database from across the behavioral sciences suggests both that there is substantial variability in experimental results across populations and that WEIRD subjects are particularly unusual compared with the rest of the species-frequent outliers. The domains reviewed include visual perception, fairness, cooperation, spatial reasoning, categorization and inferential induction, moral reasoning, reasoning styles, selfconcepts and related motivations, and the heritability of IQ. The findings suggest that members of WEIRD societies, including young children, are among the least representative populations one could find for generalizing about humans. Many of these findings involve domains that are associated with fundamental aspects of psychology, motivation, and behavior-hence, there are no obvious a priori grounds for claiming that a particular behavioral phenomenon is universal based on sampling from a single subpopulation. Overall, these empirical patterns suggests that we need to be less cavalier in addressing questions of human nature on the basis of data drawn from this particularly thin, and rather unusual, slice of humanity. We close by proposing ways to structurally re-organize the behavioral sciences to best tackle these challenges.