Suchergebnisse

AbstractContradictory elements in U.S. immigration policy, reflecting a long‐time struggle between inclusionary and exclusionary views, have resulted in federal legislation filled with compromises and tradeoffs that, at state and sub‐state levels, play out in unclear interpretations and uneven, highly discretionary administration and enforcement of immigration law and policy. This research describes a tool of discretionary administration—administrative burden—that is increasingly used in enforcing immigration law and policies at state and sub‐state levels and presents a theoretical frame for more fully investigating and addressing its consequences. The application and implications of administrative burden are explored empirically and qualitatively in a case study analysis of an enforcement‐oriented policy change in Texas that denied access to birth certificates for some citizen‐children born to Mexican immigrants. To better understand the potential consequences of this and related policies, interviews with immigrant parents and longitudinal data from a survey of children of immigrants are analyzed to assess both short‐term and later outcomes of children who are denied economic assistance and other benefits under policies that impose barriers to their integration into society. The study findings point to serious, adverse consequences for citizen children of state and sub‐state immigration policies that create administrative burden and perpetuate racial discrimination, while simultaneously diminishing the transparency, fairness, and effectiveness of public administration.

Since modern welfare reform began in the 1980s, we have seen low-income parents leave the welfare rolls and join the workforce in large numbers. At the same time, the Earned Income Tax Credit has offered a monetary incentive for low-income parents to work. Thus, unlike some of the other two-generation mechanisms discussed in this issue of Future of Children , policies that encourage low-income parents to work are both widespread and well-entrenched in the United States.

But parents' (and especially mothers') work, writes Carolyn Heinrich, is not unambiguously beneficial for their children. On the one hand, working parents can be positive role models for their children, and, of course, the income they earn can improve their children's lives in many ways. On the other hand, work can impair the developing bond between parents and young children, especially when the parents work long hours or evening and night shifts. The stress that parents bring home from their jobs can detract from their parenting skills, undermine the atmosphere in the home, and thereby introduce stress into children's lives.

Unfortunately, it is low-income parents who are most likely to work in stressful, low-quality jobs that feature low pay, little autonomy, inflexible hours, and few or no benefits. And low-income children whose parents are working are more likely to be placed in inadequate child care or to go unsupervised. Two-generation approaches, Heinrich writes, could maximize the benefits and minimize the detriments of parents' work by expanding workplace flexibility, and especially by mandating enough paid leave so that mothers can breastfeed and form close bonds with their infants; by helping parents place their children in high-quality child care; and by helping low-income parents train for, find, and keep a well-paying job with benefits.

This research empirically assesses the quality of evidence that agencies provided to the Office of Management and Budget in the application of the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART), introduced in 2002 to more rigorously, systematically, and transparently assess public program effectiveness and hold agencies accountable for results by tying them to the executive budget formulation process and program funding. Evidence submitted by 95 programs administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services for the PART assessment is analyzed using measures that capture the quality of evidence and methods used by programs and information on characteristics of agencies that might relate to program results and government funding decisions. The study finds that of those programs offering some evidence, most was internal and qualitative, and about half did not assess how their performance compared to other government or private programs with similar objectives. Programs were least likely to provide externally generated evidence of their performance relative to long‐term and annual performance goals. Importantly, overall PART and results scores were (statistically) significantly lower for programs that failed to provide quantitative evidence and did not use long‐term measures, baseline measures or targets, or independent evaluations. Although the PART program results ratings and overall PART scores had no discernible consequences for program funding over time, the PART assessments appeared to take seriously the evaluation of evidence quality, a positive step forward in recent efforts to base policy decisions on more rigorous evidence.

This study examines public management challenges faced by educational agencies that are required to set up a market for providing choice in supplemental educational services (SES) for students in underperforming schools and to hold nongovernmental providers accountable for their performance in increasing student achievement. The operations and performance of SES providers in a large urban school district, as well as how their performance in increasing student achievement relates to their market shares, are examined empirically and through qualitative information gathered through focus groups, interviews, and student surveys. The study finds that SES provider market shares were not highly correlated with estimates of provider performance or other relevant vendor characteristics, and local educational agencies were not satisfied with their level of control over service quality and educational outcomes. Control over the flow of funds, which improved over time, was their primary lever for managing these third-party relationships. Adapted from the source document.

Both the evidence-based policy and performance management movements aim to improve government effectiveness by developing and utilizing a more rigorous base of information and scientific evidence to guide decisions about program design, funding, implementation, and management. In practice, however, differences and tensions between these movements—such as their methods and standards for assembling and analyzing data, and the strategic timing and use of this information to influence policy and hold public managers accountable for performance—could limit their success. Using cases and empirical studies, this article considers questions about what should count as evidence, how it should be communicated, who should judge the quality and reliability of evidence and performance information, and how to achieve a balance between processes that produce rigorous information for decision making and those that foster democratic governance and accountability. Recommendations are made for improving government effectiveness by using more rigorous information in decision making, along with acknowledgment of the limitations and risks associated with such efforts.