Wege der Bewusstseinsentwicklung in verschiedenen sozialen Kontexten: eine qualitativ-empirische Untersuchung auf Basis von personenzentrierten Gesprächen
In: Schriftenreihe des Instituts für Bewegungswissenschaftliche Anthropologie e.V. 19
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In: Schriftenreihe des Instituts für Bewegungswissenschaftliche Anthropologie e.V. 19
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 75, Heft 2, S. 422-435
ISSN: 0022-3816
World Affairs Online
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 75, Heft 2, S. 422-435
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: Political behavior
ISSN: 1573-6687
In: Kyklos: international review for social sciences, Band 75, Heft 1, S. 30-47
ISSN: 1467-6435
AbstractEnding global poverty has been at the forefront of the development agenda since the 1970s, but many donors have failed to target their funds toward this goal. Activists have tackled this issue by appealing to donors' humanitarian motives, but we know little about what explains donors' decisions on how much to give to the poorest countries. This paper develops the donor motivation and foreign policy approaches and identify donors' development motives and their budget sizes as potential determinants of poverty selectivity. We evaluate their explanatory power by assessing whether their relationships with selectivity are in the hypothesized directions and generalize beyond a particular dataset. Employing cross‐validation and Bayesian Model Averaging, we find few measures of donor motivations provide a generalizable and hypothesized explanation for poverty selectivity. In contrast, donor budget sizes exhibit a relationship that is both hypothesized and externally valid. Our study offers the first systematic analysis of aid selectivity and generates implications for recent approaches to improve the quality of foreign aid and the conventional approach to study foreign aid allocation and donor motives.
In: Political research quarterly: PRQ ; official journal of the Western Political Science Association and other associations, Band 75, Heft 3, S. 797-811
ISSN: 1938-274X
Research indicates that susceptibility to having one's job replaced by technology is associated with candidate and party preferences in affluent democracies, but there is little understanding of why. We investigate whether workers exposed to technology are more supportive of candidates and parties that prioritize the economy, unemployment, and welfare state programs, currently or with historical reputations for doing so. In the United States which we examine here, however, technology threatening jobs has not been politically salient and partisan attachments are strong, which could limit issue-based conversions in candidate preferences. To examine these possibilities, we use survey experiments randomizing exposure to information about the individual-level threat of losing one's job to technology and hypothetical candidate issue priorities in experiments with and without party labels. We find that there are some differences in "issue premiums" among high-exposure individuals in the party labels experiment, but whether individuals are made aware of their exposure does not explain any issue-based variation in candidate preferences. We also find that when made aware of their exposure to technology, high- and low-exposure Republicans and low-exposure independents become slightly more supportive of Republican candidates.
In: Review of policy research, Band 38, Heft 2, S. 164-179
ISSN: 1541-1338
AbstractObservers argue that robots and other advanced technology will eliminate millions of jobs across affluent democracies in the coming decades. But do citizens in affluent democracies recognize this, and if so, does it affect how salient they find economic problems compared to other problems the governments might address? Using a unique Eurobarometer survey with an extensive set of questions about technology we investigate the extent of sociotropic and selfish employment concerns regarding technology and examine how these concerns are associated with the micro‐level prioritization of economic problems in European mass publics. We find that sociotropic employment concerns regarding technology are widespread compared to selfish, but that only those with selfish employment concerns demonstrate greater prioritization of economic problems. Our findings have important implications for understanding how people view the threat posed by technology to their jobs and potential shifts in policy agendas as technology‐induced job loss spreads.
In: International interactions: empirical and theoretical research in international relations, Band 45, Heft 3, S. 474-499
ISSN: 1547-7444
It is well-known that donors give considerably more foreign aid to former colonies than to countries lacking past colonial ties. Unfortunately, we know relatively little about why this is the case. For one, there is almost never a theoretical justification for the inclusion of colonial history in statistical models. For the other, the only explicitly made rationale by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) actually predicts an interpretational problem: colonial history not only increases a former colony's saliency to the donor, but also has left deep marks on recipients' social and political institutions today. Both aspects shape how much aid a donor transfers to the recipient. This leaves ambiguous the meaning of the routinely found positive, sizable, and significant coefficient of colonial history on aid flows. We solve the inferential quandary by using a decomposition approach from labor econometrics. Our results show that about 75–100% of the colony effect on foreign aid stems from the greater saliency that donors give to policy concessions from former colonies.
World Affairs Online
In: Heinrich , T & Loftis , M 2019 , ' Democracy Aid and Electoral Accountability ' , Journal of Conflict Resolution , vol. 63 , no. 1 , pp. 139-166 . https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717723962
Although foreign policies often fail to successfully promote democracy, over a decade of empirical research indicates that foreign aid specifically for democracy promotion is remarkably successful at improving the survival and institutional strength of fragile democracies. However, these measures cannot tell us how well democracy aid supports the central promise of democracy: accountable government. Since institutions can be subverted in various ways that undermine accountability, it is vital to know whether democracy aid supports accountability to assess its overall success. We provide evidence for this by analyzing incumbent turnover in elections following poor economic performance – the economic vote – as a measure of voting to achieve performance accountability. In our analysis of over 1,100 elections in 114 developing countries between 1975 and 2010, we find distinct evidence that increasing receipt of democracy aid is associated with more economic voting. Results are robust to numerous alternative empirical specifications.
BASE
In: British journal of political science, Band 50, Heft 1, S. 103-127
ISSN: 1469-2112
Recent theories of foreign aid assume that moral motives drive voters' preferences about foreign aid. However, little is known about how moral concerns interact with the widely accepted instrumental goals that aid serves. Moreover, what effects does this interplay have on preferences over policy actions? This article assesses these questions using a survey experiment in which respondents evaluate foreign aid policies toward nasty recipient regimes (those that violate human rights, rig elections, crack down on media, etc.). The results indicate that the publicdoeshave a strong aversion to providing aid to nasty recipient regimes, but that it also appreciates the instrumental benefits that aid helps acquire. Contrary to a mainstay assertion in the literature, the study finds that moral aversion can largely be reversed if the donor government engages more with the nasty country. These findings call into question the micro-foundations of recent theories of foreign aid, and produce several implications for the aid literature.
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 64, Heft 7-8, S. 1418-1442
ISSN: 1552-8766
Foreign policy often creates geographically concentrated domestic benefits. A prominent example is the tying of development aid to purchases from the donor country. This feature of aid highlights the utility in examining foreign policy as an instance of pork-barrel politics. Considering tied aid in terms of legislators' incentives to provide constituent benefits, we argue that people will support an increase in foreign aid spending more when it would promote local economic activity, while opposing aid cuts more when reduced local economic output would result. Crucially, we also expect that people will support their state's US senator more when informed that the senator attempted to secure (or retain) locally beneficial funds. We find support for our expectations in a novel survey experiment of US citizens. Our results suggest that legislators' electoral incentives, and consequential local spending, can help explain the adoption of foreign policies despite national-level public disapproval.
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 64, Heft 7/8, S. 1418-1442
ISSN: 1552-8766
Foreign policy often creates geographically concentrated domestic benefits. A prominent example is the tying of development aid to purchases from the donor country. This feature of aid highlights the utility in examining foreign policy as an instance of pork-barrel politics. Considering tied aid in terms of legislators' incentives to provide constituent benefits, we argue that people will support an increase in foreign aid spending more when it would promote local economic activity, while opposing aid cuts more when reduced local economic output would result. Crucially, we also expect that people will support their state's US senator more when informed that the senator attempted to secure (or retain) locally beneficial funds. We find support for our expectations in a novel survey experiment of US citizens. Our results suggest that legislators' electoral incentives, and consequential local spending, can help explain the adoption of foreign policies despite national-level public disapproval.
World Affairs Online
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 63, Heft 1, S. 139-166
ISSN: 1552-8766
Although foreign policies often fail to successfully promote democracy, over a decade of empirical research indicates that foreign aid specifically for democracy promotion is remarkably successful at improving the survival and institutional strength of fragile democracies. However, these measures cannot tell us how well democracy aid supports the central promise of democracy: accountable government. Since institutions can be subverted in various ways that undermine accountability, it is vital to know whether democracy aid supports accountability to assess its overall success. We provide evidence for this by analyzing incumbent turnover in elections, following poor economic performance—the economic vote—as a measure of voting to achieve performance accountability. In our analysis of over 1,100 elections in 114 developing countries between 1975 and 2010, we find distinct evidence that increasing receipt of democracy aid is associated with more economic voting. Results are robust to numerous alternative empirical specifications.
World Affairs Online
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 63, Heft 1, S. 139-166
ISSN: 1552-8766
Although foreign policies often fail to successfully promote democracy, over a decade of empirical research indicates that foreign aid specifically for democracy promotion is remarkably successful at improving the survival and institutional strength of fragile democracies. However, these measures cannot tell us how well democracy aid supports the central promise of democracy: accountable government. Since institutions can be subverted in various ways that undermine accountability, it is vital to know whether democracy aid supports accountability to assess its overall success. We provide evidence for this by analyzing incumbent turnover in elections, following poor economic performance—the economic vote—as a measure of voting to achieve performance accountability. In our analysis of over 1,100 elections in 114 developing countries between 1975 and 2010, we find distinct evidence that increasing receipt of democracy aid is associated with more economic voting. Results are robust to numerous alternative empirical specifications.