Suchergebnisse

Public broadcasting has a particular institutional structure in Germany. This is illustrated for instance by such institutions are a special commission for determining the financial needs of public broadcasting and the broadcasting commission of the Lander prime ministers. This institutional structure assures the independence of public broadcasting from markets and politics. For Lander governments this institutional structure consists of a functional compulsory negotiation system. The concept of joint-decision-making argues that the requirement to find unanimous decisions stimulates incremental changes instead of institutional reforms. Nevertheless, since January 1st 2013 public broadcasting funding experienced an institutional reform. A device-dependent fee was replaced by a device independent, flat fee per household or work place. Reasons for the reform lay in the negotiation process. Among Lander a veil of ignorance, a segmented decision-making process and a combination of positive and negative coordination resulted in the institutional reform. Adapted from the source document.

Anecdotal evidence of public media coverage & academic journal contributions in the field of political science give reason for examine more closely the relationship between the type of electoral mandate & committee membership. In general, the type of mandate & committee membership of German Bundestag members between 1949 & 2005 prove to be stable. Hardly any changes have occurred between the direct- & the list-track patterns of the German two-vote electoral system. Moreover, Bundestag members hardly change the type of committee on which they are members. This has led to more directly elected members of the Bundestag serving on the committees for agriculture, traffic & construction (called constituency committees in the political science literature) & to more list members of the Bundestag serving on the committees for health, defense, family & development, classified as party committees. Adapted from the source document.