How Context Shapes the Authority of International Courts
In: 79:1 Law & Contemporary Problems 1-36 (2016).
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In: 79:1 Law & Contemporary Problems 1-36 (2016).
SSRN
In: American journal of international law: AJIL, Band 107, Heft 4, S. 737-779
ISSN: 2161-7953
The Community Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS Court) is an increasingly active and bold adjudicator of human rights. Since acquiring jurisdiction over human rights complaints in 2005, theECOWASCourt has issued numerous decisions condemning human rights violations by the member states of the Economic Community of West African States (Community). Among this Court's path-breaking cases are judgments against Niger for condoning modern forms of slavery and against Nigeria for impeding the right to free basic education for all children. TheECOWASCourt also has broad access and standing rules that permit individuals and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to bypass national courts and file suits directly with the Court. Although the Court is generally careful in the proof that it requires of complainants and in the remedies that it demands of governments, it has not shied away from politically courageous decisions, such as rulings against the Gambia for the torture of journalists and against Nigeria for failing to regulate multinational companies that have degraded the environment of the oil-rich Niger Delta.
In: American Journal of Comparative Law, Band 60(3)
SSRN
In: International Courts and Tribunals Ser.
International Court Authority challenges fundamental preconceptions about when, why, and how international courts become important and authoritative actors in national, regional and international politics. Examining global and regional bodies, this volume investigates how political and social contexts shape the authority of international courts.
In: European journal of international law, Band 27, Heft 2, S. 293-328
ISSN: 1464-3596
World Affairs Online
In: 27 European Journal of International Law, 293-328 (2016)
SSRN
In: 107 American Journal of International Law 737-779 (2013)
SSRN
In: American journal of international law: AJIL, Band 103, Heft 1, S. 1-47
ISSN: 2161-7953
Forty years ago, the small and underdeveloped nations on the mountainous western edge of South America formed a regional integration pact to promote economic growth, regulate foreign investment, and harmonize national laws. Overall, their enterprise has not turned out well. Riven by political schisms, economic shocks, and weak domestic legal and judicial systems, the five principal countries of the Andean Community—Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador,Peru, and Venezuela— have failed to live up to their potential as South America's second largest trading bloc. The member states have relaunched the Andean integration project and revised its policies on multiple occasions, with at best only mixed results. Not surprisingly, most commentators have ignored the Andean Community or dismissed it as a failure.
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 63, Heft 3, S. 449-463
ISSN: 1468-2478
AbstractThis article introduces a Thematic Section and theorizes the multiple ways that judicializing international relations shifts power away from national executives and legislatures toward litigants, judges, arbitrators, and other nonstate decision-makers. We identify two preconditions for judicialization to occur—(1) delegation to an adjudicatory body charged with applying designated legal rules, and (2) legal rights-claiming by actors who bring—or threaten to bring—a complaint to one or more of these bodies. We classify the adjudicatory bodies that do and do not contribute to judicializing international relations, including but not limited to international courts. We then explain how rights-claiming initiates a process for authoritatively determining past violations of the law, identifying remedies for those violations, and preventing future violations. Because judicializing international relations occurs in multiple phases, in multiple locations, and involves multiple actors as decision-makers, governments often do not control the timing, nature, or extent to which political and policy decisions are adjudicated. Delegation—and the associated choice of institutional design features—is thus only the first step in a chain of processes that determine how a diverse array of nonstate actors influence politically consequential decisions.
In: International organization, Band 65, Heft 4, S. 673-707
ISSN: 1531-5088
AbstractSeveral prominent human rights treaties seek to minimize violations during emergencies by authorizing states to "derogate"—that is, to suspend certain civil and political liberties—in response to crises. The drafters of these treaties envisioned that international restrictions on derogations, together with international notification and monitoring mechanisms, would limit rights suspensions during emergencies. This article analyzes the behavior of derogating countries using new global data sets of derogations and states of emergency from 1976 to 2007. We argue that derogations are a rational response to domestic political uncertainty. They enable governments facing serious threats to buy time and legal breathing space from voters, courts, and interest groups to confront crises while signaling to these audiences that rights deviations are temporary and lawful. Our findings have implications for studies of treaty design and flexibility mechanisms, and compliance with international human rights agreements.
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 63, Heft 3, S. 449-530
ISSN: 1468-2478
World Affairs Online