Legitimacy and Lawmaking: A Tale of Three International Courts
In: 14 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 479 (2013)
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In: 14 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 479 (2013)
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In: Cambridge University Press, 2011
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In: European Law Journal, Band 17, Heft 5, S. 701
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In: BALANCING WEALTH AND HEALTH: GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE BATTLE OVER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES IN LATIN AMERICA , Rochelle Dreyfuss & César Rodríguez-Garavito, eds. (2013)
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In: International organization, Band 64, Heft 4, S. 563-592
ISSN: 1531-5088
AbstractAre international courts power-seeking by nature, expanding the reach and scope of international rules and the courts' authority where permissive conditions allow? Or, does expansionist lawmaking require special nurturing? We investigate the relative influences of nature versus nurture by comparing expansionist lawmaking in the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Andean Tribunal of Justice (ATJ), the ECJ's jurisdictional cousin and the third most active international court. We argue that international judges are more likely to become expansionist lawmakers where they are supported by substate interlocutors and compliance constituencies, including government officials, advocacy networks, national judges, and administrative agencies. This comparison of two structurally identical international courts calls into question prevailing explanations of ECJ lawmaking, and it suggests that prevailing scholarship puts too much emphasis on the self-interested power-seeking of judges, the importance of institutional design features, and the preferences of governments to explain lawmaking by international courts.
In: International organization, Band 64, Heft 4, S. 563-592
ISSN: 0020-8183
World Affairs Online
In: International Organization, Band 64, Heft 4
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Working paper
In: 79:1 Law & Contemporary Problems 1-36 (2016).
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In: American journal of international law: AJIL, Band 107, Heft 4, S. 737-779
ISSN: 2161-7953
The Community Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS Court) is an increasingly active and bold adjudicator of human rights. Since acquiring jurisdiction over human rights complaints in 2005, theECOWASCourt has issued numerous decisions condemning human rights violations by the member states of the Economic Community of West African States (Community). Among this Court's path-breaking cases are judgments against Niger for condoning modern forms of slavery and against Nigeria for impeding the right to free basic education for all children. TheECOWASCourt also has broad access and standing rules that permit individuals and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to bypass national courts and file suits directly with the Court. Although the Court is generally careful in the proof that it requires of complainants and in the remedies that it demands of governments, it has not shied away from politically courageous decisions, such as rulings against the Gambia for the torture of journalists and against Nigeria for failing to regulate multinational companies that have degraded the environment of the oil-rich Niger Delta.
In: American Journal of Comparative Law, Band 60(3)
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In: 107 American Journal of International Law 737-779 (2013)
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In: American journal of international law, Band 107, Heft 4, S. 737-779
ISSN: 0002-9300
World Affairs Online
In: International organization, Band 65, Heft 4, S. 673-707
ISSN: 0020-8183
World Affairs Online
In: International organization, Band 65, Heft 4, S. 673-707
ISSN: 1531-5088
AbstractSeveral prominent human rights treaties seek to minimize violations during emergencies by authorizing states to "derogate"—that is, to suspend certain civil and political liberties—in response to crises. The drafters of these treaties envisioned that international restrictions on derogations, together with international notification and monitoring mechanisms, would limit rights suspensions during emergencies. This article analyzes the behavior of derogating countries using new global data sets of derogations and states of emergency from 1976 to 2007. We argue that derogations are a rational response to domestic political uncertainty. They enable governments facing serious threats to buy time and legal breathing space from voters, courts, and interest groups to confront crises while signaling to these audiences that rights deviations are temporary and lawful. Our findings have implications for studies of treaty design and flexibility mechanisms, and compliance with international human rights agreements.