Suchergebnisse

The article explores the political business cycle in Norway from the early 1980s onwards. It is shown that unemployment growth is related to uncertainty about likely parliamentary majorities, and to the level of political conflict between such majorities. Data indicate that voter expectations are formed on the basis of likely majority winners in votes, not in seats. Unemployment growth is unrelated to sudden and unpredictable changes in the composition of government. This suggests that the instruments influencing unemployment growth are within the domain of the legislative, not the executive, power. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract.  The costly lobbying model of Potters and van Winden is confronted with data on lobbying interactions between local assemblies and the national assembly in Norway. A total of 239 interactions are studied. Survey responses by a large number of voters and politicians, as well as registry data on fiscal standing, demographics and elections are utilised. Two of the main predictions of the costly lobbying model gain support in the data. The probability of obtaining substantial discretionary funding from the central level increases: with decreasing conflict of interest between local and central politicians; and with the lobbying cost incurred by local politicians. For a given conflict and cost, however, the rate of lobbying success depends crucially on structural characteristics of the municipality. In particular, the success rate is significantly higher for poor municipalities located in national electoral districts with many seats per voter than for rich municipalities located in districts with few seats per voter.

A formal analysis of a possible adjustment in the present voting institutions of the Norwegian parliament is conducted. The analysis is confined to three unitary players in a minority situation. It is argued that such a set‐up represents a fairly accurate description of the present political situation in the Norwegian budget process. The proposed adjustment in the voting institutions leads to something that resembles a de facto constructive vote of no confidence in the budget process. Such an instrument is often said to strengthen a minority government. The formal ana‐lysis shows that the adjusted voting institution selects a Condorcet winner if such a winner exists. If, however, no such winner exists, the minority government is always defeated. The latter finding implies that if a cycle in preferences is present, the adjusted voting institution will amplify the inherent instability. This is in stark contrast to the common claim that institutions help break cycles.

A formal analysis of a possible adjustment in the present voting institutions of the Norwegian parliament is conducted. The analysis is confined to three unitary players in a minority situation. It is argued that such a set-up represents a fairly accurate description of the present political situation in the Norwegian budget process. The proposed adjustment in the voting institutions leads to something that resembles a de facto constructive vote of no confidence in the budget process. Such an instrument is often said to strengthen a minority government. The formal analysis shows that the adjusted voting institution selects a Condorcet winner if such a winner exists. If, however, no such winner exists, the minority government is always defeated. The latter finding implies that if a cycle in preferences is present, the adjusted voting institution will amplify the inherent instability. This is in stark contrast to the common claim that institutions help break cycles. 2 Tables, 1 Figure, 17 References. Adapted from the source document.

Models of electoral agency address the levels of discipline and selection that voters can achieve in elections. The models are demanding in terms of individual belief formation and consistency of behavior. We investigate a baseline model of electoral agency in a controlled laboratory environment. This baseline model, although simple, forms the central plank of more complex electoral agency models. Our design seeks to limit the behavioral impact of social preferences. We find little support for the baseline model in our data. However, simple (non-rational) learning rules explain behavioral patterns well. Simulations indicate that non-rational learning drives behavior most forcefully towards equilibrium in situations that are favorable to Bayesian updating. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]