Suchergebnisse

If it be true that every generation selects and reads historical evidence in the light of its own aspirations and anxieties, one should expect one's contemporaries to take some interest in, and show sympathetic understanding for, periods of social stresses and strains. Having passed through three and a half decades of political and economic upheavals, and having little reason for believing that the time of troubles has come to an end, this generation is likely to feel some affinity with past epochs that appear to have suffered from similar symptoms of a deep-rooted social malaise. Perhaps the historian may derive some comfort from the knowledge that his age is not unique in having to contend with what, in moments of despair, appears to be an adverse trend of a secular nature.At one time or another during his studies every economic historian must have come up against questions that should have shocked him into a realization of the vast methodological difficulties of his subject. If, as the theorists insist, inter-personal comparisons of utility are illegitimate, how can the historian justify his practice of using such concepts as group welfare? If he cannot form aggregates, how can he hope to be able to compare the wealth of nations at different times? But even assuming that such comparisons were possible: do we have properly defined criteria of economic growth and decline, or of prosperity and depression? And if not, are we entitled to use these and similar ill-defined terms for the purpose of characterizing and contrasting different periods of economic history?

As indicated by the attribute "historical," this essay is not concerned with evaluations on metaphysical grounds of life and the universe. Statements by philosophers to the effect that this is the best of all possible worlds, or that "life is a business the returns for which do not cover the costs by any means," may indeed become objects of historical inquiry. After all, what has not become "historicized" these last hundred years! But investigations of that kind are not likely to yield any great results. Metaphysics, like mathematics, is all but timeless.A good deal more closely related to historical and political categories are certain fundamental ideas regarding the nature of man. It has been observed that "the pessimistic view of human nature is, and has always been, the deepest sense of a conservative argument." The inverse is true of a philosophy of progress, which is almost invariably based on an intrinsically optimistic evaluation of human nature. We shall have to touch occasionally upon that interdependence of metaphysical and politico-historical thought in the course of this inquiry. Our chief interest, however, centres on different problems.