Suchergebnisse
Filter
8 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
SSRN
SSRN
How to Avoid Black Markets for Appointments with Online Booking Systems
In: American economic review, Band 111, Heft 7, S. 2127-2151
ISSN: 1944-7981
Allocating appointment slots is presented as a new application for market design. Online booking systems are commonly used by public authorities to allocate appointments for visa interviews, driver's licenses, passport renewals, etc. We document that black markets for appointments have developed in many parts of the world. Scalpers book the appointments that are offered for free and sell the slots to appointment seekers. We model the existing first-come-first-served booking system and propose an alternative batch system. The batch system collects applications for slots over a certain time period and then randomly allocates slots to applicants. The theory predicts and lab experiments confirm that scalpers profitably book and sell slots under the current system with sufficiently high demand, but that they are not active in the proposed batch system. We discuss practical issues for the implementation of the batch system and its applicability to other markets with scalping. (JEL C92, D47)
SSRN
Working paper
A Primer on Pass-on
SSRN
Working paper
Zur Weiterwälzung von Preisaufschlägen in regulierten Industrien (On the Pass-on of Overcharges in Regulated Industries)
In: Maier-Rigaud, Frank, Heller, C.-Philipp and Philip Hanspach (2019) Zur Weiterwälzung von Preisaufschlägen in regulierten Industrien, Neue Zeitschrift für Kartelrecht (NZKart), 12/2019, 650-658.
SSRN
Working paper
Zur Weiterwälzung von Preisaufschlägen (On the Pass-On of Overcharges)
In: Maier-Rigaud, Frank, Heller, C.-Philipp and Philip Hanspach (2019) Zur Weiterwälzung von Preisaufschlägen, Journal of German and European Competition Law (WuW, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb), 69(11), 561-568.
SSRN
Working paper
Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited
We show that Ergin & Sönmez's (2006) results which show that for schools it is a dominant strategy to truthfully rank the students under the Boston mechanism, and that the Nash equilibrium outcomes in undominated strategies of the induced game are stable, rely crucially on two assumptions. First, (a) that schools need to be restricted to find all students acceptable, and (b) that students cannot observe the priorities set by the schools before submitting their preferences. We show that relaxing either assumption eliminates the strategy dominance, and that Nash equilibrium outcomes in undominated strategies for the simultaneous induced game in case (a) and subgame perfect Nash equilibria in case (b) may contain unstable matchings. We also show that when able to manipulate capacities, schools may only have an incentive to do so if students submit their preferences after observing the reported capacities.