pt. ONE: AN OVERVIEW OF MANAGEMENT. 1: Introduction to organizations and management -- 2: The nature of management -- 3: The development of management thought -- pt. TWO: PLANNING FOR A DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENT. 4: The environment of business -- 5: Ethics and corporate social responsibility -- 6: Planning and strategy formulation -- 7: Fundamentals of decision-making -- 8: Planning and decision aids -- pt. THREE: ORGANIZING. 9: Organizational structure and design -- 10: Organizational change and learning -- pt. FOUR: LEADING. 11: Motivating for performance -- 12: The nature of leadership -- Organizational communication -- 14: Groups and teams in organizations -- 15: Organizational cultures and workforce diversity -- pt. FIVE: CONTROLLING. 16: Controlling in organizations -- 17: Contemporary issues in management
This study is an integrative examination of three aspects of joint venture formation: complementarity of the partners, ownership/control and joint venture autonomy. Past research has examined each of these concepts individually without considering potential interactive effects. Moreover, most past studies have used global measurements ignoring critical dimensions within each concept. For example, most studies of ownership/control have examined the effects of dominant control by one partner versus shared influence. This approach overlooks the possibility that joint venture parents may exert varying degrees of control over decision making in the different functional areas. Personal interviews of 98 managers involved in oil and gas exploration and production joint ventures are used in an investigation of the three joint venture concepts. In this industry, complementarity had little if any effect on joint venture performance. In fact, complementarity actually appeared to have a negative impact on several dimensions of joint venture performance. Qualitative data suggest that joint venture partners with distinctive competencies in different functional areas may experience difficulties in implementing potential complementarities. Moreover, it may be important for all joint venture partners to perceive some influence over the strategic decisions of the joint venture, regardless of their actual influence over those decisions. Perhaps the most important implications of this study are for future joint venture research. First, a dimensionalized approach to the issues of implementation and performance is justified. Examining ownership/control over each functional area provided additional insights into issues of joint venture management and aided in explaining the results of tests using global measures. Second, analyses of joint venture autonomy and ownership/control produced different results based on the functional area under consideration. Thus, the use of global measures is likely to result in the loss of information. Third, joint venture performance is a multidimensional concept. The results of the analyses related to performance varied according to the dimension of performance under consideration. Some measures of performance were actually negatively related to others. It is believed that this outcome is appropriate. Performance is measured relative to the various goals established for a joint venture. Some goals may be in conflict with others or present managers with tradeoffs to consider. Research that fails to consider multiple dimensions of performance may lose some of the richness of the performance concept. Finally, joint ventures are particularly likely to be subject to goal conflicts since they are formed by two or more firms, each with its own set of goals. Ultimately, a joint venture is measured by the extent to which the venture meets the goals and expectations of the individual partners. As a result, it is necessary for joint venture research to examine performance related issues from the perspective of the individual partners.
Since the inception of the council-manager plan, the role of the city manager in city government policymaking has been debated. This article develops a contingency typology of city manager policy roles. It relates the desirability by city managers of five policy roles to two contingency variables, the degree of political competition and the degree of task analyzability. Using interview and survey data, two questions based on this typology are tested. The results provide only modest support for the contingency typology because a strong overriding preference for one policy role was found.
SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE COUNCIL-MANAGER PLAN, THE ROLE OF THE CITY MANAGER IN CITY GOVERNMENT POLICYMAKING HAS BEEN DEBATED. THIS ARTICLE DEVELOPS A CONTINGENCY TYPOLOGY OF CITY MANAGER POLICY ROLES. IT RELATES THE DESIRABILITY BY CITY MANAGERS OF FIVE POLICY ROLES TO TWO CONTINGENCY VARIABLES, THE DEGREE OF POLITICAL COMPETITION AND THE DEGREE OF TASK ANALYZABILITY. USING INTERVIEW AND SURVEY DATA, TWO QUESTIONS BASED ON THIS TYPOLOGY ARE TESTED. THE RESULTS PROVIDE ONLY MODEST SUPPORT FOR THE CONTINGENCY TYPOLOGY BECAUSE A STRONG OVERRIDING PREFERENCE FOR ONE POLICY ROLE WAS FOUND.
Eleven organizational change approaches were reviewed and analyzed in terms of the impact they have on major system variables in organizations, the type of change agent most likely to utilize each approach, and the relative affective, cognitive, and trusting behaviors required by the client system for the successful implementation of each approach. Different approaches are linked to different change-agent styles and needs of the client system.
