Suchergebnisse

We use a dataset of 615 firms which participated in 114 illegal cartels - convicted by the European Commission between 1999 and 2016 - to investigate the determinants of the duration of a firm's participation in a cartel. Applying a Weibull proportional hazard model with a particular focus on the impact of internal and external time-varying determinants, we find that firms show an increased probability to leave a cartel if prior exits occurred as well as in periods of high demand growth. However, we find a reduced exit probability in situations of prior entries to the cartel or in periods of high interest rates. Additional estimations on the cartel level further suggest that firm exits increase the probability of a cartel breakdown substantially.

We provide a comprehensive quantitative assessment of cartels and the related cartel enforcement process in the European Union (EU) from 2001 to 2015. In a first step, we present a detailed characterization of all cartel cases decided by the European Commission (EC) with respect to various criteria such as the number of involved firm groups, cartel market shares and market share asymmetries, involved industries, affected countries, types of infringement, types of cartel breakdown, as well as cartel duration. In a second step, we complement this cartel-based analysis with a quantitative assessment of the public cartel enforcement process in the EU, subdivided further into its duration, types of cartel detection, the leniency program, the settlement procedure, overall fines imposed, and the conclusive appeals process with the General Court (GC) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ).

We use a dataset of 615 firms which participated in 114 illegal cartels - convicted by the European Commission between 1999 and 2016 - to investigate the determinants of the duration of a firm's participation in a cartel. Applying a Weibull proportional hazard model with a particular focus on the impact of internal and external time-varying determinants, we find that firms show an increased probability to leave a cartel if prior exits occurred as well as in periods of high demand growth. However, we find a reduced exit probability in situations of prior entries to the cartel or in periods of high interest rates. Additional estimations on the cartel level further suggest that firm exits increase the probability of a cartel breakdown substantially.

We provide a comprehensive quantitative assessment of cartels and the related cartel enforcement process in the European Union (EU) from 2001 to 2015. In a first step, we present a detailed characterization of all cartel cases decided by the European Commission (EC) with respect to various criteria such as the number of involved firm groups, cartel market shares and market share asymmetries, involved industries, affected countries, types of infringement, types of cartel breakdown as well as cartel duration. In a second step, we complement this cartel-based analysis with a quantitative assessment of the public cartel enforcement process in the European Union - subdivided further into its duration, types of cartel detection, the leniency program, the settlement procedure, overall fines imposed, and the conclusive appeals process with the General Court (GC) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ).

The introduction of the European Union (EU) Settlement Procedure in 2008 aimed at promoting the procedural efficiency of cartel investigations by the European Commission (EC). We use a data set consisting of 579 firms groups convicted by the EC for cartelization from 2000 to 2015 to investigate the impact of the settlement procedure on the probability to file an appeal. Based on the estimation of a model of the firm's decision to appeal in the presettlement era, we subsequently run out-of-sample predictions to estimate the number of hypothetical appeals cases in the settlement era absent the settlement procedure. Our findings of a settlement-induced reduction in the number of appeals of up to 55 percent allow the conclusion that the introduction of the settlement procedure generated substantial additional benefits to society beyond its undisputed key contribution of a faster and more efficient handling of cartel investigations by the EC.

AbstractOpinion on acetaldehyde as a flavouring substance: considerations for risk assessmentAcetaldehyde occurs naturally in many foods and is also used as a flavouring due to its fruity aroma. The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) classified acetaldehyde as possibly carcinogenic to humans and, in combination with oral intake via alcoholic beverages, as carcinogenic to humans. Therefore, the question arises whether the use of acetaldehyde as a flavouring agent is still justifiable. The Senate Commission on Food Safety (SKLM) of the German Research Foundation (DFG) reviewed the scientific basis for health risk assessment of the use of acetaldehyde as a flavouring substance and adopted an opinion. Based on the available data, it is at present not possible to conclude if acetaldehyde is genotoxic and mutagenic in vivo after oral exposure. There is also uncertainty regarding the contribution of acetaldehyde as a flavouring substance to the overall exposure to acetaldehyde. Therefore, a science-based assessment on health risk related to the use of acetaldehyde as a flavouring is not possible at present. Considering the genotoxic potential as well as numerous data gaps that need to be closed for a full risk assessment, the SKLM is concerned about the safety of acetaldehyde as a flavouring substance. For reasons of precautionary consumer protection, the SKLM considers that the use of acetaldehyde as a food additive should be re-evaluated.