Suchergebnisse

This article examines the German response to Rwanda's genocide, an important concern that previous research largely has ignored. Like the United States, Great Britain, France (up to mid-June l994) and other powers, Germany chose the role of bystander, observing and condemning the genocide, but failing to act. At first glance, this might appear unsurprising. The frequently cited "culture of reticence" in foreign affairs would seem to explain this posture of inaction. However, a second look uncovers several factors that could lead one to expect a German engagement in efforts to halt the genocide. By l994, Germany had contributed military and medical units to ten humanitarian efforts, including two United Nations missions in Cambodia (1991-1993) and in Somalia (1992-1994). Moreover, the Federal Republic's staunch support for human rights, as well as its considerable diplomatic and foreign aid presence in Rwanda, might have suggested a visible response to the mounting evidence of genocide. Why did this not occur? Why was there so little public discussion of German obligations to take steps to halt the genocide? On the one hand, answers to these questions are important in order to test previous research on the factors that led to states' participation in humanitarian interventions. On the other, they are significant for the inner-German debate about history and memory. Can the memory of the Holocaust inform debates about Germany's international obligations? How and under what circumstances might considerations of political morality shape foreign policy decisions?

For more than a century, Germany has had a well-balanced systemof cities showcasing considerable variety in their social and physicalmake-up. It has lacked spectacular global cities like New York,Tokyo, or London. Instead, western cities include industrial citieslike those in the Rhine-Ruhr Valley and cities shaped by universitiesand research (Göttingen or Freiburg), media and publishing (Hamburg),culture and high-technology sectors (Munich), banking andfinance (Frankfurt/Main), wholesale trade and insurance (Cologneand Düsseldorf), as well as government and administration (Berlin,Bonn, and most state capitals). Dramatic social or economic crisesthat generate debates about urban decline have not happened.Thanks in part to effective urban governments, no German city hascome close to the near-collapse of American rustbelt cities duringthe early 1980s, or the fiscal meltdown of New York City in the1970s. Crime has been consistently lower and less violent, and theAmerican racial divide has no equivalent in German cities. East Germancities, while more unevenly developed, have been no less stable.East Berlin was the dominant center, linked to the industrialcities in the North (Rostock) and South (Leipzig, Halle, Dresden) bya rather creaky infrastructure.

Seit den 50er Jahren wurde in der Bundesrepublik für die Beziehungen zwischen Arbeit und Kapital ein besonderes System der Mitbestimmung entwickelt, das den Beschäftigten wirtschaftlichen Nutzen bringt und ihren Einfluß auf Unternehmensentscheidungen stärkt. Seine eigentliche Bedeutung liegt in der Verknüpfung von Zusammenarbeit, Verhandlung und Verständigung zwischen Vertretern der Beschäftigten und der Unternehmensleitungen. Weniger eindeutig als der Nutzen für das einzelne Unternehmen und seine Beschäftigten ist der makroökonomische Nutzen der Mitbestimmung. Auch bleibt die Wirkung der Mitbestimmung hinsichtlich der Beseitigung von Arbeitslosigkeit in einer Wirtschaftskrise fraglich. (AuD-Hng)

Particularly in terms of employment security and apprenticeship programs.