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This study offers a theoretical framework for understanding how institutional instability affects judicial behavior under dictatorship and democracy. In stark contrast to conventional wisdom, the central findings of the book contradict some assumptions that only independent judges rule against the government of the day. Set in the context of Argentina, the study uses the tools of positive political theory to explore the conditions under which courts rule against the government. In addition to shedding light on the dynamics of court-executive relations in Argentina, the study provides general lessons about institutions, instability, and the rule of law. In the process, the study builds a set of connections among diverse bodies of scholarship, including US judicial politics, comparative institutional analysis, positive political theory, and Latin American politics

Institutional instability and interbranch crises pose a fundamental challenge to democracies in Latin America and the developing world more generally. Combining a standard game theoretic model of crisis bargaining with a unique dataset on courts, executives, and legislatures for 18 Latin American countries between 1985 and 2008, the article develops a strategic account of how interbranch crises emerge and evolve. In addition to providing the first systematic picture of the frequency, type, and location of interbranch crises for the region, the article demonstrates that the decision to initiate an interbranch crisis is influenced by the allocation of institutional powers, public support for the targeted branch, and the expectations of success based on recent experiences. Building on these results, the article identifies several novel directions for future research on institutional instability.

This article provides a novel explanation for ticket splitting rooted in the literature on voter uncertainty. The argument is that in contexts marked by asymmetrical competition, such as single party autocracies, ticket splitting can provide voters with a kind of electoral insurance policy. By simultaneously voting for challengers in one race and incumbents in another, voters act to minimize the risks associated with electing a relatively unknown opposition party. Drawing on survey data for one of Latin America's most important elections, the 2000 Mexican presidential race, I evaluate empirically whether voters behave in ways consistent with the logic of ticket splitting as electoral insurance. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]

Building on the separation-of-powers approach in American politics, this article develops a new micro-level account of judicial decision-making in contexts where judges face institutional insecurity. Against conventional wisdom, I argue that under certain conditions the lack of judicial independence motivates judges to "strategically defect" against the government once it begins losing power. The result is a reverse legal-political cycle in which antigovernment decisions cluster at the end of weak governments. Original data on more than 7.500 individual decisions by Argentine Supreme Court justices (1976-1995) are used to test hypotheses about why, when, and in which types of cases judges are likely to engage in strategic defection. Consistent with the theory's predictions, the results of the analysis show a significant increase in antigovernment decisions occurring at the end of weak dictatorships and weak democratic governments. Examining subsets of decisions and controlling for several additional variables further corroborate the strategic account. (American Political Science Review / FUB)