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"During President Barack Obama's first term in office, the United States expanded its military presence in Afghanistan and increased drone missile strikes across Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. The administration also deployed the military to combat piracy in the Indian Ocean, engaged in a sustained bombing operation in Libya, and deployed U.S. Special Forces in Central Africa to capture Joseph Kony. In these cases, President Obama decided to use force without congressional approval. Yet, this increased executive power has not been achieved simply by the presidential assertion of such powers. It has also been supported by a group of senators and representatives who, for political reasons, seek to avoid responsibility for military action abroad. Hendrickson examines President Obama's use of force in his first term with four major case studies. He demonstrates that, much like his predecessors, Obama has protected the executive branch's right not only to command, but also to determine when and where American forces are deployed. He also considers the voting records of Democrat John Kerry and Republican John McCain in the Senate, detailing how both men have played leading roles in empowering the commander-in-chief while limiting Congress's influence on military decision-making. Obama at War establishes that the imperial presidency poses significant foreign policy risks, and concludes with possible solutions to restore a more meaningful balance of power. The first book on the constitutional and political relationship between President Obama and the U.S. Congress and the use of military force, this reassessment of war powers provides a lucid examination of executive privilege and legislative deference in the modern American republic"--Provided by publisher

"Examines the first four post-Cold War secretaries general-Manfred Wörner, Willy Claes, Javier Solana, and George Robertson. Drawing on interviews with former NATO ambassadors, alliance military leaders, and senior NATO officials, Hendrickson demonstrates that the secretary general is often the central diplomat in generating cooperation within NATO"--Provided by publisher

It has now been more than a year since the US began military action against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. Since the war began, President Obama has repeatedly requested that Congress give the authority for the action, but Congress has made little progress in that direction. Ryan C. Hendrickson places most of the blame for Congressional inaction on the Speaker of the House, John Boehner. He argues that Boehner's lack of desire for a vote is expanding the president's war powers – powers that, constitutionally, Congress should be exercising much more oversight of.

On October 14, 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama informed congressional leaders that approximately 100 American military personnel would be deployed to four African states: the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, and Uganda in an effort to eliminate the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) led by Joseph Kony. Some of these troops, who were sent with "appropriate combat equipment," had already been deployed. Obama noted that these forces "will not themselves engage LRA forces unless necessary for self-defense." The President added that he was informing Congress of these actions "as part of my efforts to keep the Congress fully informed, consistent with the War Powers Resolution," and that he was carrying out Congress's legislative desires by fulfilling the expectations of the Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009. The legislative process that led to the passage of this Act was unique and, in many respects, contrasts sharply with Congress's traditional roles in American military and security policy formation. By playing a much more assertive role than it traditionally has, Congress pushed President Obama to develop a comprehensive strategy to eliminate the LRA, which included the potential for the president to provide military support to African militaries. This paper examines the legislative and political process that led Congress to support the passage of this Act. Apart from Congress demonstrating a rare degree of foreign policy assertiveness, this issue is especially interesting since it dealt with a region where American strategic interests are arguably perceived as less clear. Thus, the policy formation is unique and especially interesting for understanding why Congress became so active for a human rights concern that impacts so few Americans and has limited strategic interests to the United States. While the findings presented here provide some support for the previous scholarship on congressional assertiveness in foreign policy, this paper also notes a number of case-specific political variables that were significant in the passage of this particular legislation. Among these factors, the multiple roles played by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Kony's identity as a "terrorist", and the legislative process used to pass this Act, all are central to understanding why Joseph Kony and the LRA generated so much congressional attention. Finally, this article addresses the extent to which the United States will likely use force in future humanitarian conflicts, especially those in Africa, as well as the extent to which NGOs and Congress will shape military decisions abroad. Adapted from the source document.

Earlier this week, President Obama announced that he would ask for a Congressional vote on any potential military intervention in Syria. Ryan C. Hendrickson writes that Congress did not force Obama to seek legislative approval, and that even before the announcement many of Congress's key leaders had already fallen in line with the President's desire for a military strike. Now, we are witnessing strong pressure from the congressional leadership with those on both sides of the political divide lobbying the House and Senate to support their commander in chief.