Suchergebnisse

Bearing the legacy from central-planned system, the tax system in local China still lacks transparency and, in many cases, the liabilities of firms, especially those with extensive influences, are subject to negotiation despite the new tax-reform 1994. Applying Hirschman's Exit-Voice theory, we construct a game model of interplay between firm and local government, in terms of exit and voice for preferential tax treatments, thereby revealing dynamics of these two options under rational entrepreneurship of economizing transaction cost. Suggested by the model, exit not only induces firm to opt for voice, it also underpins firm's voice that forces local government to compromise. Particularly, when holding private information of exit cost, firm is able to mimic behaviors of those with high mobility so as to boost the effectiveness of voice. The empirical cases fully illustrate such rational entrepreneurship of exit plus voice to profit from local preferential policy.

This paper addresses the distinction between core members and common members in farmer cooperatives in China in terms of the allocation of ownership rights, decision rights, and income rights. Empirical results from a multiple case study indicate that the life cycle and the governance characteristics of farmer cooperatives in China differ from cooperatives in the West world. The genesis of cooperatives in China is due to entrepreneurial farmers and the government, rather than the bottom-up, collective action process of many small farmers. The distribution of equity capital, decision rights, and income rights is quite skewed towards core members. We conclude that the development of cooperatives in China adapts to the local economic and cultural environment and goes via an alternative way to cooperatives in the Western world.