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Frontmatter -- Contents -- Figures and Tables -- Acknowledgments -- 1. The Puzzle of Organizing Collective Action -- 2. Constructing Multilateral Military Coalitions -- 3. A Quantitative Test: What Factors Influence Multilateral Military Coalition Building? -- 4. Chaining Communists: The Korean War (1950–1953) -- 5. Saving Darfur: UNAMID (2007–) -- 6. Fighting for Independence in East Timor: INTERFET (1999–2000) -- 7. Resisting Rebels in Chad and the Central African Republic: EUFOR Chad-CAR (2008–2009) -- 8. Power, Diplomacy, and Diplomatic Networks -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index

How do states overcome problems of collective action in the face of human atrocities, terrorism and the threat of weapons of mass destruction? How does international burden-sharing in this context look like: between the rich and the poor; the big and the small? These are the questions Marina E. Henke addresses in her new book Constructing Allied Cooperation. Through qualitative and quantitative analysis of 80 multilateral military coalitions, Henke demonstrates that coalitions do not emerge naturally. Rather, pivotal states deliberately build them. They develop operational plans and bargain suitable third parties into the coalition, purposefully using their bilateral and multilateral diplomatic connections - what Henke terms diplomatic embeddedness—as a resource. As Constructing Allied Cooperation shows, these ties constitute an invaluable state capability to engage others in collective action: they are tools to construct cooperation. Pulling apart the strategy behind multilateral military coalition-building, Henke looks at the ramifications and side effects as well. As she notes, via these ties, pivotal states have access to private information on the deployment preferences of potential coalition participants. Moreover, they facilitate issue-linkages and side-payments and allow states to overcome problems of credible commitments. Finally, pivotal states can use common institutional contacts (IO officials) as cooperation brokers, and they can convert common institutional venues into fora for negotiating coalitions. The theory and evidence presented by Henke force us to revisit the conventional wisdom on how cooperation in multilateral military operations comes about. The author generates new insights with respect to who is most likely to join a given multilateral intervention, what factors influence the strength and capacity of individual coalitions, and what diplomacy and diplomatic ties are good for. Moreover, as the Trump administration promotes an "America First" policy and withdraws from international agreements and the United Kingdom completes Brexit, Constructing Allied Cooperation is an important reminder that international security cannot be delinked from more mundane forms of cooperation; multilateral military coalitions thrive or fail depending on the breadth and depth of existing social and diplomatic networks.

Abstract
Many countries serving in multilateral military coalitions are "paid" to do so, either in cash or in concessions relating to other international issues. An examination of hundreds of declassified archival sources as well as elite interviews relating to the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, the Iraq War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization operation in Afghanistan, the United Nations–African Union operation in Darfur, and the African Union operation in Somalia reveals that these payment practices follow a systematic pattern: pivotal states provide the means to cover such payments. These states reason that rewarding third parties to serve in multilateral coalitions holds important political benefits. Moreover, two distinct types of payment schemes exist: deployment subsidies and political side deals. Three types of states are most likely to receive such payments: (1) states that are inadequately resourced to deploy; (2) states that are perceived by the pivotal states as critical contributors to the coalition endeavor; and (3) opportunistic states that perceive a coalition deployment as an opportunity to negotiate a quid pro quo. These findings provide a novel perspective on what international burden sharing looks like in practice. Moreover, they raise important questions about the efficiency and effectiveness of such payment practices in multilateral military deployments.

This article presents a new dataset on UN peacekeeping fatalities that occurred during 1948–2015. The data includes five types of fatality counts: total fatalities, fatalities caused by accidents, illness, malicious acts (i.e. hostile deaths) and a fourth category marked "other incident types." For every UN operation during 1948–2015, data on the number of these four types of UN fatalities are coded at the yearly as well as monthly level. The monthly data also indicate the nationality as well as the appointment type (troop, police, observer, local or international staff) of the deceased. This dataset is the first of its kind. It offers new opportunities for research on important aspects of UN peacekeeping. Herein, I introduce the data, provide details on the coding process and present trends and an empirical application.

Tony Blair tried throughout the preparatory phase of the US-led Iraq intervention in 2003 to influence US policy on the Middle East Peace Process. This article tries to understand how Blair fared in this endeavour. Using newly declassified documents, it examines the circumstances under which the US administration listened and engaged with British ideas and when and why it ignored British requests. The study shows that Blair was able to extract the greatest US concessions on the Middle East Peace Process in moments when Great Britain's participation in the Iraq campaign was the most uncertain. The findings promote fresh thinking on how, when and why the United Kingdom can influence US decision-making.

This article presents a new dataset on UN peacekeeping fatalities that occurred during 1948–2015. The data includes five types of fatality counts: total fatalities, fatalities caused by accidents, illness, malicious acts (i.e. hostile deaths) and a fourth category marked "other incident types." For every UN operation during 1948–2015, data on the number of these four types of UN fatalities are coded at the yearly as well as monthly level. The monthly data also indicate the nationality as well as the appointment type (troop, police, observer, local or international staff) of the deceased. This dataset is the first of its kind. It offers new opportunities for research on important aspects of UN peacekeeping. Herein, I introduce the data, provide details on the coding process and present trends and an empirical application.

How does the United States build multilateral military coalitions? Conventional wisdom focuses on the role of formal alliance structures. Allies band together because they share threat perceptions, political ideology, norms, and values. I argue instead that US-led coalition-building efforts are influenced by the entirety of bilateral and multilateral ties that connects the United States with a third party. The breadth of institutions matters because it allows officials to gather information on the potential coalition partner's deployment preferences beyond straightforward security considerations—such as what kind of economic and political considerations affect its willingness to join the coalition. Diplomatic embeddedness also helps American officials identify linkages between military and non-military interests. This facilitates the construction of side-payments. I find evidence for my argument by using an original dataset including all US-led multilateral coalitions in the pre– and post–Cold War era. I complement the quantitative analysis with a case study on US coalition-building efforts for the Korean War.