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AbstractMany policy systems are experimenting with collaborative institutions to manage complex policy problems in the face of persistent conflict and scientific uncertainty. Policy networks are central to the theory of why collaborative institutions are effective. While many policy systems naturally become segregated, fragmented, or siloed due to homophily, collaborative institutions are hypothesized to create more integrated systems of organizational collaboration. Collaborative institutions may, therefore, be evaluated by the extent to which they reduce the tendency toward homophily and increase the integration of policy networks. This paper evaluates three collaborative institutions in regional land‐use planning and specifies a theory of the program from two prominent frameworks: Institutional Collective Action and the Advocacy Coalition Framework. Results show that three forms of homophily are at work, and that in some cases, collaborative institutions successfully reduce the tendency toward network segregation.

This article investigates the role of power and ideology in the endogenous formation of policy networks. According to the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), shared ideology (conceptualized as a system of policy‐relevant beliefs and values) is the primary driver of collaboration within policy subsystems. On the other hand, Resource Dependency Theory suggests that power‐seeking is an important rationale behind network structure, and that collaborative ties are formed primarily on the basis of perceived influence. Hypotheses are tested using a new method of egocentric network correlation, based on survey data of policy networks in five regional planning subsystems in California (N = 506). Results suggest that ideology is an important force behind network cohesion: Not only do policy elites systematically avoid networking with ideologically dissimilar actors but collaborative ties are also systematically formed among actors with shared beliefs. Power‐seeking does not operate on a network‐wide scale but may drive network formation among coalitions of ideologically similar agents.

AbstractWe study the persistence of network segregation in networks characterized by the co-evolution of vertex attributes and link structures, in particular where individual vertices form linkages on the basis of similarity with other network vertices (homophily), and where vertex attributes diffuse across linkages, making connected vertices more similar over time (influence). A general mathematical model of these processes is used to examine the relative influence of homophily and influence in the maintenance and decay of network segregation in self-organizing networks. While prior work has shown that homophily is capable of producing strong network segregation when attributes are fixed, we show that adding even minute levels of influence is sufficient to overcome the tendency towards segregation even in the presence of relatively strong homophily processes. This result is proven mathematically for all large networks and illustrated through a series of computational simulations that account for additional network evolution processes. This research contributes to a better theoretical understanding of the conditions under which network segregation and related phenomenon—such as community structure—may emerge, which has implications for the design of interventions that may promote more efficient network structures.

This article uses exponential random graph models to investigate the roles of policy-relevant beliefs and social capital as drivers of network structure. The advocacy coalition framework argues that actors with similar policy beliefs are more likely to form coalitions, leading to policy subsystems fragmented into ideological groups. Social capital is defined as trust and norms of reciprocity, which helps cement cooperative relationships. Hypotheses are tested using survey data of policy elites involved in land-use and transportation planning in four regions of California. The findings suggest that coalitions of actors with similar belief systems are knit together by policy brokers seeking to build transitive social relationships. Adapted from the source document.

This article seeks to improve our understanding of policy institutions and cooperation by adapting Long's (1958)analysis of the ecology of games to the context of collaborative land use and transportation planning in California. The traditional institutional rational choice analysis argues that collaborative institutions reduce the transaction costs of cooperation among multiple policy actors. The ecology of games framework extends IRC by emphasizing the consequences of multiple institutions and identifies several reasons why collaborative institutions may actually reduce the amount of cooperation in existing policy venues. Analyses of survey data from policy actors in five California regions demonstrate that higher levels of cooperation in collaborative institutions are associated with lower levels of cooperation in other land‐use and transportation planning institutions.

Networks are an important part of the environmental policy process as they influence the ability of actors to synthesize information and learn to manage complex risks. According to the Advocacy Coalition Framework, the dynamics of policy network formation lead to structures exhibiting belief‐oriented segregation—that is, a high correspondence between shared beliefs and policy‐relevant interactions. These structures may be produced through at least two pathways: belief homophily, where actors actively seek out connections with others sharing their belief system, and policy‐oriented learning, where connected actors become more similar in their beliefs. The cross‐sectional design of much policy research does not allow an examination of these potentially complementary forces that shape belief systems and networks. These dynamics are studied using data on policy beliefs and networking in the U.S. environmental risk policy subsystem across two time periods, 1985 and 2000 (N = 223). Results indicate strong homophily effects, but relatively weak learning effects in the evolution of this policy network. This study helps pave the way for additional research on the dynamics shaping policy networks and beliefs, and helps to clarify the differences between individual versus organizational contributions to policy network evolution.