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AbstractThere is a growing interest in analyzing what citizens think about democracy. However, gauging citizens' opinions about a complex concept such as democracy might be hindered by the apparent low levels of political sophistication of mass publics. This paper contributes to the emerging literature on citizens' views and evaluations of democracy by analyzing to what extent ordinary citizens are capable of developing structured opinions about democracy and its constitutive principles. For this purpose, the paper adapts Converse's notion of political belief systems to analyze the articulation of individuals' democracy belief systems (DBS). The first goal of this paper is to conceptualize and operationalize the main components of individuals' DBS: cognitive availability, horizontal constraint, and vertical constraint. Drawing on data from the sixth round of the European Social Survey, the second goal is to describe the articulation of DBS in Europe. The third and final aim of this paper is to trace the most relevant individual- and country-level correlates of the articulation of the three components of DBS. In line with recent findings about political belief systems in other policy domains, the results indicate that most Europeans have coherently structured attitudes about democracy. However, even if the results imply that Europeans have a relatively articulated DBS, the empirical analysis also reveals some individual- and country-level variation in the articulation of specific components of DBS.

There is a growing interest in analyzing what citizens think about democracy. However, gauging citizens' opinions about a complex concept such as democracy might be hindered by the apparent low levels of political sophistication of mass publics. This paper contributes to the emerging literature on citizens' views and evaluations of democracy by analyzing to what extent ordinary citizens are capable of developing structured opinions about democracy and its constitutive principles. For this purpose, the paper adapts Converse's notion of political belief systems to analyze the articulation of individuals' democracy belief systems (DBS). The first goal of this paper is to conceptualize and operationalize the main components of individuals' DBS: cognitive availability, horizontal constraint, and vertical constraint. Drawing on data from the sixth round of the European Social Survey, the second goal is to describe the articulation of DBS in Europe. The third and final aim of this paper is to trace the most relevant individual- and country-level correlates of the articulation of the three components of DBS. In line with recent findings about political belief systems in other policy domains, the results indicate that most Europeans have coherently structured attitudes about democracy. However, even if the results imply that Europeans have a relatively articulated DBS, the empirical analysis also reveals some individual- and country-level variation in the articulation of specific components of DBS.

The literature disagrees over the extent to which defection from mainstream parties and support for challenger parties are related to individuals' discontent with the functioning of democratic political systems. This article develops the democratic protest voting model, a theoretical framework to analyze how different forms of democratic discontent relate to the chance of defecting from mainstream parties and supporting left- and right-wing challenger parties. The empirical results reveal that voters tend to support parties that are aligned with the specific nature of their democratic discontent. These results imply that voting for challenger parties should not be conceptualized as a mere expression of protest decoupled from political preferences, but as a process of democratic protest voting that is informed by normative democratic preferences.

Defence date: 21 October 2016 ; Examining Board: Professor Hanspeter Kriesi, European University Institute (Supervisor); Professor Pedro C. Magalhães, University of Lisbon; Professor Mariano Torcal, Pompeu Fabra University; Professor Alexander H. Trechsel, European University Institute ; This thesis is a collection of four empirical studies that analyze Europeans' democratic aspirations and evaluations and their behavioral implications. It is well established that most citizens support democracy in the abstract but that a substantial proportion of them are not fully satisfied with the way democracy works. However, we know significantly less about the specific type of democracy citizens aspire to, about the extent to which they evaluate that their democracies meet these democratic aspirations, and about how these aspirations and evaluations relate to their political behavior. Drawing on an innovative dataset that provides a detailed account of individuals' democratic aspirations and evaluations I first assess the availability and structuration of these attitudes towards democracy in the belief systems of Europeans. Next, I analyze how democratic aspirations and evaluations and the imbalance between the two relate to political participation and party choice decisions. The empirical analyses reveal that: (i) these attitudes towards democracy are widely available and coherently structured in the belief systems of most individuals; (ii) that democratic aspirations and evaluations, and the imbalance between the two, are significantly related to the likelihood of turning out to vote and demonstrating, but that, at the same time, their impact is contingent on a series of individual- and macro-level factors; (iii) that the imbalance between democratic aspirations and evaluations that individuals perceive for specific elements democracy is significantly related to their likelihood of defecting from mainstream parties and voting for different types of challenger parties. In the conclusion to this dissertation I discuss the potential implications of these findings for the quality and stability of democracies, and how these findings qualify some aspects of the prevailing optimistic outlook about the behavior of those who are critical or dissatisfied with the functioning of their democracies.

SUMARIO: I.- Introducción. II.- El artículo 109 de la Constitución. III.- El derecho a la información de los parlamentarios. IV.- ¿Es un derecho común individual de los Diputados?. V.- Contenido del artículo 7 del RCV. VI.- Datos, informes o documentos objeto del derecho de los Diputados. VII.- Procedimiento para el requerimiento de datos e informes o documentos.

AbstractWhat is political and what is not? While conventional wisdom in public opinion research assumes a shared understanding of political matters, recent studies have challenged this assumption. In this article, we theorize and analyze how the prominence of abortion in the media affects whether or not citizens consider abortion a political issue. Leveraging the unexpected surge in media attention to abortion regulation in Spanish media during our survey fieldwork we implement an Unexpected Event During Survey Design. Our findings reveal that respondents interviewed after abortion gained salience in the media were 10% points more likely to perceive abortion as a political matter.

In this paper, we analyze the short-term impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on Europeans' attitudes toward democracy. For this purpose, we leverage the coincidence of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 with the fieldwork of the European Social Survey in 10 countries. By means of an unexpected event during survey design, we analyze the impact of the invasion on 12 different attitudes toward democracy, including overt support for democracy, satisfaction with democracy, as well as the importance attributed to particular democratic principles. The results of this comprehensive analysis reveal that the invasion did not have a substantive impact on individuals' attitudes toward democracy. The invasion of a neighboring democratic country by an autocratic power did not alter Europeans' satisfaction with democracy, their support for this political regime, or the importance they attribute to different democratic principles.

AbstractThis article analyzes individuals' preferences for a consensus or a majoritarian type of democracy. We theorize that variation in these preferences is a function of both institutional learning (long term) and individuals' position as a political minority or majority (short term). First, as a result of institutional learning, we expect that individuals living in democracies characterized by coalition governments will favor consensus democracy. Conversely, those living in countries characterized by single-party executives will favor majoritarian democracy. Second, we expect that individuals' position as an electoral minority or majority will affect these beliefs. Those who vote for small parties will favor a consensus democracy, while those who vote for large parties will support a majoritarian system. However, whether institutional learning or individuals' position as a political minority or majority prevail in influencing these preferences about the ideal model of democracy will be a function of the democratic trajectory of each country. We test these arguments drawing on data from the European Social Survey.

Financiado para publicación en acceso aberto: Universidade da Coruña/CISUG ; [Abstract] This article analyzes individuals' preferences for a consensus or a majoritarian type of democracy. We theorize that variation in these preferences is a function of both institutional learning (long term) and individuals' position as a political minority or majority (short term). First, as a result of institutional learning, we expect that individuals living in democracies characterized by coalition governments will favor consensus democracy. Conversely, those living in countries characterized by single-party executives will favor majoritarian democracy. Second, we expect that individuals' position as an electoral minority or majority will affect these beliefs. Those who vote for small parties will favor a consensus democracy, while those who vote for large parties will support a majoritarian system. However, whether institutional learning or individuals' position as a political minority or majority prevail in influencing these preferences about the ideal model of democracy will be a function of the democratic trajectory of each country. We test these arguments drawing on data from the European Social Survey. ; This research has received financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation, and Universities through research grant CSO2017-83086-R

Utilitarian theories propose that support for the EU is based on an instrumental calculus about the costs and benefits of European integration. Drawing on these theories, we analyze whether and how ads produced by European institutions affect public support for the EU. Our findings, based on a panel survey experiment, indicate that these ads increase support for the EU, and that ads emphasizing the policy benefits of European integration are more effective than ads emphasizing its reduced costs. However, these positive effects are short-lived, since they had disappeared one year after citizens were initially exposed to the ads. In a context of increasing negativity towards the EU, these findings, based on realistic treatments, have relevant theoretical and policy implications.

En este trabajo presentamos un conjunto de graffiti identificados en el Castillo de Almansa, realizados en el contexto de la Guerra Civil Española y los primeros años de la posguerra. La totalidad de los mensajes pertenecen a militares, y son antropónimos que testimonian la presencia de estos individuos durante aquellos años en la fortaleza medieval, de entre los que destacan los pertenecientes a los voluntarios extranjeros que vinieron a ayudar en la defensa de la república española. El estudio de estos graffiti ha completado la información que de aquellos años se disponía sobre la población de Almansa, y específicamente sobre el contingente brigadista en la localidad. Pero también ha facilitado la comprensión del papel del castillo durante el conflicto, como un emplazamiento fundamental dentro del plan estratégico implementado en el territorio almanseño y la defensa local antiaérea.

This article analyzes how individual-level assessments of the quality and functioning of the representative channel affect citizens' likelihood to turn out to vote and to engage in alternative forms of non-institutionalized participation, and whether these relationships are moderated by individual resources as measured by education. Relying on novel data from the sixth round of the European Social Survey on how European citizens evaluate different aspects of democracy we show that negative evaluations of the quality of the representative channel discourage voting, but only promote participation in demonstrations among the highly educated. These findings highlight potential inequalities in citizens' ability to voice their political demands: while highly educated individuals are likely to translate their negative evaluations of the institutional channel of representation into non-institutionalized forms of participation, in the presence of negative evaluations low educated individuals are simply more likely to withdraw from politics.