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My argument against this motion is very confined. I argue simply that the motion, as drafted, embodies overreach—if passed, it does not caution merely against expansive interpretation, a contested term that is not a legal term of art, but stands for a restrictive, unrecognized rule of interpretation in relation to an entire category of international law documents, the varied instruments conferring jurisdiction on international courts and tribunals.

AbstractFrom the perspective of public international law, the legal personality of the European Union (EU) carries with it the possibility for it to exercise rights and to bear obligations on the international plane. Its quasi-federal structure, however, requires consideration as to how these rights and obligations may be exercised. In this chapter, two regimes are compared: the EU's rights and obligations as an international organisation and the possibility that its internal structures might be recognised on the international plane, thus leading to more complex notions of subsidiary responsibility, shared between the various levels of European governance.

International law has a self-determination problem. The paradoxes raised by the concept, almost like a Russian doll, beget ever more paradoxes. Yet, when pressed for clarity as to its scope, scholars, practitioners, and legal advisers all shy away from precise definitions. Based on the apparent collision of competing claims, self-determination is reduced to a claim to create a new State; territorial integrity is viewed as a necessary protection for existing political units. A neat binary is constructed whereby self-determination is reduced to instances where it does not affect territorial integrity (so-called 'internal self-determination') and those where it disrupts it significantly ('external self-determination'). The self-determination/territorial integrity binary, though taught widely in international law textbooks, doctrine, and practice, is deceptively simple and fails to tell the whole story; it is for this reason that we propose a different way of conceptualising self-determination claims in international law. In this piece, we will develop an argument that the concept of self-determination is in fact a category, a genus, of which there exist four distinct forms, or species: polity-based; identitarian; remedial; and colonial. We argue that by rethinking self-determination in this manner, the common features of these four forms help us further to give content to the concept, as well as better to understand the different legal treatment that self-determination claims have received within international law.

International Law presents a comprehensive yet student-focused approach to the subject, providing a contemporary and stimulating account of international law. With critical coverage delivered through a wide range of learning features, students are encouraged to engage with legal debates and controversies. --