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A discussion of interconnections of public att's on major internat'l issues with those on nat'l domestic questions as revealed by polls & surveys of US samples during the 30 yrs following the mid-1930's. The very concepts of liberal vs conservative, or left vs right, have had little or no connotation for most internat'l issues among a majority of Amer's. These terms have normally been more closely associated in the public mind with domestic econ & welfare issues. Policy preferences on most domestic nat'l issues manifested little or no connections with views on most aspects of foreign relations prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor or during the D. D. Eisenhower admin. Moreover, relative liberals on domestic welfare, econ, & related questions were only somewhat more favorable than domestic conservatives to foreign econ aid, liberalization of relations with communist gov's, & multilateral cooperation generally during the H. Truman, J. F. Kennedy, & L. B. Johnson admin's. Whereas liberal internat'l thinking has been more apparent among the better educated, comfortably off, segments of the pop, approval of soc welfare & most other transfers of wealth from haves to have nots at home has been more widespread among the educ'ly, econ'ly, & soc'ly underprivileged. When SES has been held constant, is between these domestic opinions & internat'1 att's have been somewhat higher. However, general fiscal conservatives who have emphasized cutting the overall federal budget & reducing taxes & the nat'l debt have been consistently (though not sharply) less supportive of foreign aid throughout these 3 decades than have fiscal liberals. Amer's who have favored liberalized federal aid to educ have been rather consistently more favorable to multilateral cooperation than those opposed to expanded assistance to educ. Liberals on civil liberties &, particularly since the mid-1950's, civil rights have likewise been more supportive than their domestic opponents of econ aid, relaxation of tensions with the USSR & Communist China, & shifts of emphases from military means to wider pol'al, diplomatic, econ, & cultural collaboration in world affairs. During the 1960's internat'l act's were more closely linked with racial views than with opinions on any other major domestic issue. These statistical linkages between views on race relations, civil liberties, & federal educ'l policies on the one hand & internat'l relations on the other have been due in part to demographic factors, esp to the disproportionate incidence of more liberal thinking on all these issues among the educ'ly & soc'ly more privileged. Nevertheless, since the mid1950's some positive is have persisted even when such demographic variables have been controlled. AA.

This paper explores the feelings of Negroes about world affairs, via secondary analyses of existing nat'l opinion surveys. The extent of interest & knowledge about internat'l affairs, the directions of opinions before Pearl Harbor, the att's of Negroes towards foreign aid during the postwar decade, tariffs & trade, & intercultural exchange & immigration & communism, nat'l defense & collective security are discussed. Negro Amer's have shifted their att's regarding foreign affairs from isolationism in the 1950's to relative liberalism in the 1960's. This trend is explained by the growth in Negro voting & other pol'al participation & the identification with Democratic presidential & congressional candidates. The civil rights movement in the US is also signif. H. Rosen.

An analysis of the distribution of US PO on the UN including the specialized agencies, & on US policies during the period 1954-1966, derived primarily from AIPO, SRC, NORC, & Roper surveys. Also examined are opinion diff's among major demographic, soc, & pol'al groups, inter-r's of views on diff aspects of the UN, & is with opinions on other aspects of foreign affairs. It is concluded that large majorities, larger than during the Korean War, of virtually all major groups have continued to support active US membership in the UN, to feel it has been doing at least a fair job, & to harbor favorable impressions of it. Opponents have been largely confined to general isolationists, roughly 10% of the adult pop. Even on such controversial issues as Communist China, only very small minorities of any major groups would have the US withdraw if a majority of the General Assembly admitted her. In general, better educated members have been more favorable than less educated ones, the more privileged soc'ly & econ'ly more favorable than the less privileged, Jews than Christians &, among Christians in recent yrs, Catholics somewhat more than Protestants. Att'al diff's between self-identified Democrats & Republicans have been small; Republicans were more favorable under President D. D. Eisenhower, Democrats under Presidents J. F. Kennedy & L. B. Johnson. Although the conservatives of both parties have been more critical of the world body than liberals of either, Goldwater voters of 1964 in the large majority have continued to approve of the instit. The increase in membership among underdeveloped Asian & esp African states has not been accompanied by any increased tendency to favor channeling US policies elsewhere. Amer's who were critical of the internat'l org in the 1960's were no more inclined to mention the increase of these nonwhite, largely underdeveloped, often anti-Western states as the reason for their disapproval than were their counterparts before 1954. AA.