Suchergebnisse

Analyse der Motive der außenpolitischen Strategie der UdSSR in den Beziehungen zu den USA, der VR China und der BRD während der Jahre 1967-1980. Untersuchung und Rückverfolgung der Umsetzung der außenpolitischen Perzeptionen und globalpolitischen Lagebeurteilung führender sowjetischer Politiker in außenpolitisches Handeln. (BIOst-Klk)

AbstractIf competing beliefs about political events in the world stem largely from information asymmetries, then more information and knowledge should reduce the gap in competing perceptions. Empirical studies of decision making, however, often find just the reverse: as knowledge and the stakes in play go up, the beliefs about what is happening polarize rather than converge. The theory proposed here attributes this to motivated reasoning. Emotions inside the observer shape beliefs along with information coming from the outside world. A series of experiments embedded in a national survey of Americans finds that a primary driver of the beliefs someone forms about globalization, other countries, and the politics in the Middle East is how strongly they attach their social identity to the United States. Attachment produces more intense positive and negative emotions that in turn shape the interpretation of unfolding events and lead norms to be applied in an inconsistent fashion. People, in effect, rewrite reality around their favored course of action, marrying the logic of appropriateness to their own preferences. Beliefs, consequently, are not independent of preferences but related to them. Motivated reasoning, while not consistent with rational models, is predictable and can lead to expensive mistakes and double standards that undermine liberal internationalism.

Regional conflicts have played a major role in American interpretations of Soviet foreign policy. They have affected judgments about Soviet intentions and have served as a barometer of Moscow's competitiveness. This study looks at the change in Soviet policy under Gorbachev. It proposes a strategic framework for the analysis of Soviet behavior and then examines Moscow's actions in terms of military support, active involvement, and the terms for peace. Special attention is paid to Soviet behavior in Southwest Asia. The study finds that Soviet behavior changed but in ways that were more subtle than often realized. Moscow pulled back having achieved partial success through compromise more often than it retreated in defeat. The shift to a strategy of detente had numerous causes, but a simple American peace-through-strength explanation that stresses external constraints and Soviet internal weakness is inadequate. Such explanations underestimate the importance of changing perceptions of threat and mistakenly affirm a deterrence conception of reciprocity (i.e., that force begets restraint). The evidence in regional conflicts suggests that a spiral model of reciprocity (i.e., that escalation begets escalation) is more apt.

Was sind die Ziele und Interessen der Sowjetunion im Nahen Osten? Dazu gibt es eine Reihe von sich teilweise widersprechenden Aussagen. Hauptziel ist sicherlich, im strategischen Wettbewerb mit den USA den amerikanischen Einfluß zu schmälern. Moskau verwendet dazu seine Mittel jedoch moderat und vorsichtig. Geschieht dies willentlich so oder ist es Ausdruck ungenügender Macht? Die UdSSR widersetzt sich keineswegs allen Konfliktbeilegungsplänen (z.B. ihr Plan vom Juli 1984). Die Supermachtsrivalität hat jedoch bisher die UdSSR und die USA in ihrer Kompromißfähigkeit eingeschränkt. Für die amerikanische Diplomatie wäre es an der Zeit, die sowjetische Nahostpolitik einem Test zu unterziehen, um über Ziele, Interessen und Verhaltensmuster Moskaus Klarheit zu gewinnen. Dieser Test würde die amerikanische Position in der Region nicht gefährden. (SWP-Hld)

Interpretations of Soviet foreign policy often rest on assumptions about Soviet perceptions of the United States. This article presents a method for inferring Soviet perceptions. The effort builds on theories that are related to the analysis of perception in foreign policy decision-making and complements other empirical studies of Soviet statements. The article analyzes Soviet images at two levels: (1) media coverage of four regional conflicts, and (2) Politburo speeches. The media analysis concentrates on four cases—the Horn of Africa 1977-1978, North and South Yemen 1979, Iran 1978-1979, and Afghanistan 1979. The Politburo speeches cover the era of détente 1971-1978. The article finds that the view of the United States that prevails in Moscow resembles a well-known enemy stereotype. The enemy imagery is found to prevail at both levels and indicates a significant perception of threat, and possibly the relevance of an "inherent bad faith" model.