Suchergebnisse

What role do business leaders play in American democracy? The dominant narrative in political science holds that business leaders have disproportionate influence; this influence has increased over time; the public opposes business engagement in politics; and a reform agenda could counteract business influence. I contrast this narrative with a second narrative that also emerges from the literature: Business leaders are fragmented and fail to achieve many of their goals; their power has weakened over time; the public wants more business engagement with politics, not less; and no viable reform agenda would fundamentally alter business power. The juxtaposed narratives reveal several insights, including a profound ambivalence among the public about the role of business in democracy. Survey evidence confirms that Democrats in particular are both especially opposed to and especially supportive of business engagement in politics, indicative of the veracity of the competing narratives.

Depending on their state of residence, Americans can participate in Presidential nomination contests either by voting in a primary or by attending a caucus. Since caucus participation requires more time and effort than primary voting, it has long been thought that caucuses must attract a more partisan, activist, and politically extreme cohort of citizens than primaries. This paper challenges the view that more burdensome electoral institutions necessarily ought to attract more politically engaged citizens. I propose a theory of peripheral motivations that predicts caucus goers and primary voters will not differ in terms of their political attitudes or interest, but they will differ in their levels of community engagement. The key insight is that many of the reasons why citizens choose to participate or abstain from politics actually have little to do with politics. Analysis of two surveys from the 2008 Presidential election substantiates the theoretical expectations. Adapted from the source document.

"Who is to blame for our broken politics? The uncomfortable answer to this question starts with ordinary citizens with good intentions. We vote (sometimes) and occasionally sign a petition or attend a rally. But we mainly "engage" by consuming politics as if it's a sport or a hobby. We soak in daily political gossip and eat up statistics about who's up and who's down. We tweet and post and share. We crave outrage. The hours we spend on politics are used mainly as pastime. Instead, we should be spending the same number of hours building political organizations, implementing a long-term vision for our city or town, and getting to know our neighbors, whose votes will be needed for solving hard problems. We could be accumulating power so that when there are opportunities to make a difference--to lobby, to advocate, to mobilize--we will be ready. But most of us who are spending time on politics today are focused inward, choosing roles and activities designed for our short-term pleasure. We are repelled by the slow-and-steady activities that characterize service to the common good. In Politics Is for Power, pioneering and brilliant data analyst Eitan Hersh shows us a way toward more effective political participation. Aided by political theory, history, cutting-edge social science, as well as remarkable stories of ordinary citizens who got off their couches and took political power seriously, this book shows us how to channel our energy away from political hobbyism and toward empowering our values."--Amazon

"This book is the most comprehensive study to date about the consequences of campaigns using "microtargeting" databases to mobilize voters in elections. In spite of the popular aura of campaigns using secretive and sophisticated techniques to engage with voters, the book shows that most of what campaigns know about voters comes from a core set of public records. States vary in the kinds of records they collect from voters. Sometimes, state legislators pass laws about data collection for the very purpose of using government-collected personal data for their campaigns. The variation in data across the country means that campaign databases look different in different areas. Consequently, campaigns vary how they engage with voters in different areas because of the data that permit them to perceive voters' interests. Variations in data policy thus affect the kinds of electoral coalitions that campaigns build"--

This study sheds light on how 9/11 catalyzed long-term changes in the political behaviors of victims' families and neighbors. Political changes among associates of victims are important because system shocks like 9/11 can lead to rapid policy shifts, and relatives of victims often become leaders advocating for such shifts. I build upon prior research on the behavioral effects of tragic events by using a unique method of analysis. Rather than utilizing surveys, I link together individual-level government databases from before and after 9/11, and I measure the changes in the affected populations relative to similar populations that did not lose a relative or neighbor. The method I outline may prove useful in future studies of human behavior.

AbstractPrior research has shown that racial minority groups are more likely than Whites to hold negative views of Jews. We discuss several theories that may explain this phenomenon, including group competition, anti-White attitudes manifesting as antisemitism, spillover from anti-Israel attitudes, and more. Some theories, especially those developed in the mid-20th century, may be less applicable today, particularly to young adults. Through an original survey of 3,500 Americans, including an oversample of 18–30 year olds, we discover that antisemitic views remain far more common among minorities than Whites, especially among young people. However, the racial differences do not seem to be explained by common theories cited and explored in prior literature. But with Black and Hispanic Americans agreeing with antisemitic statements at similar levels as White alt-right identifiers in our sample, our findings call for renewed interest in the topic of race and antisemitism.

Who do people think are influential in their own community? This question is important for understanding topics such as social networks, political party networks, civic engagement, and local politics. At the same time as research on these topics has grown, measurement of public perceptions of local influence has dried up. Years ago, researchers took active interest in the question of community influence. They found that most ordinary Americans could identify a person who they thought had influence in their community. Respondents usually named business leaders. Where does the public stand today? In three different ways, we ask respondents who has local influence. The vast majority of respondents today cannot think of anyone. Those who do identify someone as influential rarely choose a businessperson. This article aims to reintroduce the public opinion of community influence and situate findings in related scholarship.

Concern about antisemitism in the U.S. has grown following recent rises in deadly assaults, vandalism, and harassment. Public accounts of antisemitism have focused on both the ideological right and left, suggesting a "horseshoe theory" in which the far left and the far right hold a common set of anti-Jewish prejudicial attitudes that distinguish them from the ideological center. However, there is little quantitative research evaluating left-wing versus right-wing antisemitism. We conduct several experiments on an original survey of 3500 U.S. adults, including an oversample of young adults. We oversampled young adults because unlike other forms of prejudice that are more common among older people, antisemitism is theorized to be more common among younger people. Contrary to the expectation of horseshoe theory, the data show the epicenter of antisemitic attitudes is young adults on the far right.