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This Element argues that the low dynamism of low- to mid-income Arab economies is explained with a set of inter-connected factors constituting a 'segmented market economy'. These include an over-committed and interventionist state with limited fiscal and institutional resources; deep insider-outsider divides among firms and workers that result from and reinforce wide-ranging state intervention; and an equilibrium of low skills and low productivity that results from and reinforces insider-outsider divides. These mutually reinforcing features undermine encompassing cooperation between state, business and labor. While some of these features are generic to developing countries, others are regionally specific, including the relative importance and historical ambition of the state in the economy and, closely related, the relative size and rigidity of the insider coalitions created through government intervention. Insiders and outsiders exist everywhere, but the divisions are particularly stark, immovable and consequential in the Arab world.

Although most Arab countries remain authoritarian, many have undergone a restructuring of state-society relations. Lower- and middle-class interest groups have lost ground, while big business has benefited in terms of its integration into policy-making and the opening-up of economic sectors that used to be state-dominated. Arab businesses have also started taking on aspects of public service provision in health, media and education that used to be the domain of the state, while also becoming increasingly active in philanthropy. Among the topics addressed by the contributing authors are: the role of business in recent regime change; the political outlook of businessmen; the consequences of economic liberalisation on the composition of business elites in the Middle East; the role of the private sector in orienting government policies; lobbying of government by business interests; and the mechanisms by which governments seek to keep businesses dependent upon them. The Arab Spring is likely to lead to a more pluralistic political order in the Middle East and this makes it all the more important to understand business interests in the region. They are a segment of society that have often been close to the ancien regime, but will undoubtedly play a pivotal role in a future social contract

Unpacking the Saudi state : oil fiefdoms and their clients -- Oil fiefdoms in flux : the new Saudi state in the 1950s -- The emerging bureaucratic order under Faisal -- The 1970s boom : bloating the state and clientelizing society -- The Foreign Investment Act : lost between fiefdoms -- Eluding the "Saudization" of labor markets -- The fragmented domestic negotiations over WTO adaptation -- Comparing the case studies, comparing Saudi Arabia

Intro -- Contents -- Preface -- List of Acronyms -- Dramatis Personae -- Introduction -- 1. Unpacking the Saudi State: Oil Fiefdoms and Their Clients -- Part I: Oil and History -- 2. Oil Fiefdoms in Flux: The New Saudi State in the 1950s -- 3. The Emerging Bureaucratic Order under Faisal -- 4. The 1970s Boom: Bloating the State and Clientelizing Society -- Part II: Policy-Making in Segmented Clientelism -- 5. The Foreign Investment Act: Lost between Fiefdoms -- 6. Eluding the "Saudization" of Labor Markets -- 7. The Fragmented Domestic Negotiations over WTO Adaptation -- 8. Comparing the Case Studies, Comparing Saudi Arabia -- References -- Index.

Abstract
This article argues that the low dynamism of low- to mid-income Arab economies is explained with a set of interconnected factors that constitute a particular variety of capitalism which we call 'segmented market economy'. These include an over-committed and interventionist state; deep insider–outsider divides in private sectors and labor markets that result from and reinforce lopsided state intervention; and an equilibrium of low skills and low productivity that results from and reinforces insider–outsider divides. These mutually reinforcing features undermine encompassing cooperation between state, business and labor. While some of these features are generic to developing countries, others are regionally specific, including the relative importance and historical ambition of the state in the economy and, closely related, the relative size and rigidity of the insider coalitions created through government intervention. Insiders and outsiders exist everywhere, but the divisions are particularly stark, immovable and consequential in the Arab world.

Oil monarchies of the Gulf have reacted to the upheavals that occurred in the region since 2011 through the introduction of social protection measures and clientelism in favor of local populations. With the exception of Bahrain, these measures appear for now to have pacified the companies concerned. Based on the study of the case of Saudi Arabia, however, this article demonstrates that clientelist measures have negatively affected fiscal viability of the Gulf economies and sent back these companies at arm system with respect to the State represents a long-term disability policy. Adapted from the source document.

Les monarchies pétrolières du Golfe ont réagi aux soulèvements dans la région survenus depuis 2011 en introduisant des mesures de protection sociale et de clientélisme en faveur des populations locales. À l'exception de Bahreïn, ces mesures semblent pour l'instant avoir pacifié les sociétés concernées. En s'appuyant sur l'étude du cas de l'Arabie saoudite, cet article démontre cependant que les mesures clientélistes ont affecté négativement la viabilité fiscale des économies du Golfe et renvoyé ces sociétés à un système de dépendance par rapport à l'État qui représente un handicap politique à long terme.

GLMM - Gulf Labour Markets and Migration ; Gaps in labour rights and labour prices between nationals and migrant workers are the main causes explaining the low participation of GCC citizens in the region's private labour markets. Past policies of 'Gulfization' have not directly addressed these structural constraints but have rather attempted to impose higher nationalization quotas by fiat, with limited success. More recently, some of the Gulf governments have started to use taxes and subsidies to try to narrow the labour price gap; at the same time, some have improved the labour mobility rights of foreigners. This paper provides a preliminary assessment of these モsecond generation' policies. It concludes with general observations on how the rights and price gaps could be closed more systematically and on the broader distributional reforms this might entail. ; The GLMM programme is conducted by the Gulf Research Centre (GRC) and the Migration Policy Centre (MPC) and financed by the Open Society Foundations (OSF).