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'The business of business is business,' Milton Friedman, a leading figure of the Chicago School of economic thought, famously declaimed. In his 1970 article, 'The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits', he argued that corporate managers who factor social and environmental considerations into their decision-making are, in effect, 'imposing taxes . . . and deciding how the tax proceeds shall be spent'. By deviating from their organizational duties—maximizing profits for the companies that employ them—they are appropriating money owed to shareholders and allocating it to broader social causes, a function that resembles government. Friedman objects to this behavior not on economic or legal but on political grounds: managers have not been elected and there are no principled procedures for determining which causes to support beyond 'general exhortations from on high' (Friedman 1970: 17). He also expresses scepticism about 'hypocritical window-dressing', concluding: 'our institutions, and the attitudes of the public make it in their self-interest to cloak their actions in this way' (Friedman 1970: 17).

Anna Beckers and Ioannis Kampourakis have formulated sophisticated critiques of 'The Great Shell Game', and I have learned a great deal from this exchange. Some of their criticism can be answered by clarifying the terms of the debate, which I do briefly below. I wish, however, to maintain the general thrust of my argument, and even to double down. With my title, I make an analogy between CSR and the confidence trick played by street operators who move pennies quickly between plastic cups and ask the assembled crowd to bet on where they end up. This game depends on skill but also on fraud, the operator working with a shill to mislead the audience. I suggest that as academics we must make sure that our sophistication does not place us in the role of the shill—preventing the public from noticing that corporations pocket the pennies.

La Fabrique du Droit: Une Ethnologie du Conseil d'État Bruno Latour (Paris: La Découverte, 2002)

Résumé L'article propose une réflexion sur les logiques sous-jacentes aux actions des agents de l'État dans le domaine de l'assurance chômage. Ceux-ci bénéficient d'une marge de manœuvre considérable pour appliquer le cadre légal. Des principes implicites guident leurs actions lorsqu'ils choisissent d'aider, sanctionner ou abandonner les chômeurs. Autant qu'à une logique de contrôle socio-économique, leur conduite renvoie à ce que nous voulons appeler une « économie émotionnelle », où le « feeling » tient une place centrale.