Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Acknowledgments -- CHAPTER ONE: Why Political Trust Matters -- CHAPTER TWO: Political Trust and Its Evolution -- CHAPTER THREE: Political Distrust, Not Conservatism -- CHAPTER FOUR: The Dynamic Importance of Political Trust -- CHAPTER FIVE: Political Trust and Public Support for Government Spending -- CHAPTER SIX: Political Trust and the Racial Policy Preferences of Whites -- CHAPTER SEVEN: Political Trust and the Demise of Health Care Reform -- CHAPTER EIGHT: Political Trust and the Future of American Politics -- Notes -- References -- Index

Intro -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Chapter 1. Why Extreme Leaders Don't Listen to a Moderate Public -- Chapter 2. Polarization, Political Trust, and Institutional Responsiveness -- Chapter 3. What Moves Political Trust -- Chapter 4. How Political Trust Became Polarized -- Chapter 5. How Priming Changes the Consequences of Political Trust -- Chapter 6. Political Trust Can Help Conservatives, Too -- Chapter 7. The Gordian Knot: A Bad Economy, Low Trust, and the Need for More Spending -- Chapter 8. Political Trust and Flagging Support for Obamacare -- Chapter 9. Can Things Change? -- Chapter 10. Things Will Probably Get Better, but We Are Not Sure How -- Notes -- References -- Index.

Political parties and the political system -- American parties : characteristics and competition -- Political parties and the electoral process : nominations -- Campaigns and campaign finance -- The congressional party and the formation of public policy -- Party identification, partisanship, and elections -- The American party system : problems and perspectives

Scholarly research has demonstrated rather conclusively that American political elites have undergone a marked partisan polarization over the past thirty years. There is less agreement, however, as to whether the American electorate is polarized. This review article evaluates the evidence, causes and consequences of polarization on both the elite and mass levels. A marked difference between the two is found. Elites are polarized by almost any definition, although this state of affairs is quite common historically. In contrast, mass attitudes are now better sorted by party, but generally not polarized. While it is unclear whether this potentially troubling disconnect between centrist mass attitudes and extreme elite preferences has negative policy consequences, it appears that the super-majoritarian nature of the US Senate serves as a bulwark against policy outcomes that are more ideologically extreme than the public would prefer. Moreover, a public more centrist than those who represent it has also at times exerted a moderating influence on recent policies.

For the most part, scholars who study American political parties in the electorate continue to characterize them as weak and in decline. Parties on the elite level, however, have experienced a resurgence over the last two decades. Such a divergence between elite behavior and mass opinion is curious, given that most models of public opinion place the behavior of elites at their core. In fact, I find that parties in the electorate have experienced a noteworthy resurgence over the last two decades. Greater partisan polarization in Congress has clarified the parties' ideological positions for ordinary Americans, which in turn has increased party importance and salience on the mass level. Although parties in the 1990s are not as central to Americans as they were in the 1950s, they are far more important today than in the 1970s and 1980s. The party decline thesis is in need of revision.

For the most part, scholars who study American political parties in the electorate continue to characterize them as weak and in decline. Parties on the elite level, however, have experienced a resurgence over the last two decades. Such a divergence between elite behavior and mass opinion is curious, given that most models of public opinion place the behavior of elites at their core. In fact, I find that parties in the electorate have experienced a noteworthy resurgence over the last two decades. Greater partisan polarization in Congress has clarified the parties' ideological positions for ordinary Americans, which in turn has increased party importance and salience on the mass level. Although parties in the 1990s are not as central to Americans as they were in the 1950s, they are far more important today than in the 1970s and 1980s. The party decline thesis is in need of revision. (American Political Science Review / FUB)

Scholars have consistently demonstrated that no link exists between declining political trust and declining turnout, but they have paid less attention to the effect of trust on vote choice. In an era characterized by declining trust, the incumbent party has lost, and third parties have strongly contested, four of the last eight presidential elections. Such outcomes are historically anomalous. This study demonstrates that declining political trust affects vote choice, but the electoral beneficiary differs according to electoral context. In two-candidate races, politically distrustful voters support candidates from the nonincumbent major party. In races with three viable candidates, third-party alternatives benefit from declining political trust at the expense of both major parties.

Scholars have consistently demonstrated that no link exists between declining political trust and declining turnout, but they have paid less attention to the effect of trust on vote choice. In an era characterized by declining trust, the incumbent party has lost, and third parties have strongly contested, four of the last eight presidential elections. Such outcomes are historically anomalous. This study demonstrates that declining political trust affects vote choice, but the electoral beneficiary differs according to electoral context. In two-candidate races, politically distrustful voters support candidates from the nonincumbent major party. In races with three viable candidates, third-party alternatives benefit from declining political trust at the expense of both major parties. (American Political Science Review / FUB)