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Introduction -- A theory of aggregation incentives -- Testing the theory -- Aggregation, nationalization, and the number of parties in Thailand -- Explaining aggregation in Thailand -- Term limits, aggregation incentives, and the number of parties in the Philippines -- Conclusion.

Clientelism is charatacterized by the combination of particularistic targeting and contingency-based exchange. This method of contingent exchange thrives in both autocracies and democracies. It exists in a large variety of cultural contexts. Confronted with economic development, clientelism fades away in some political contexts but adapts and survives in others. This article explores our understanding of the origins and dynamics of clientelism, focusing on the relationships between clientelism and democracy and between clientelism and development. It then evaluates the connection between clientelism and a variety of political and economic outcomes, including democratic accountability, corruption, and public goods provision. It concludes by outlining some remaining empirical and theoretical challenges and highlighting recent innovations in data collection and empirical methods. Adapted from the source document.

In 2008 the big developments in the Philippines were the signing of a historic and controversial agreement with Muslim rebels, the subsequent scuttling of that agreement by the Supreme Court, and a resumption of hostilities between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Meanwhile, the embattled Arroyo government worked to respond to a series of economic and natural disasters.

The year 2007 was typically turbulent for the Philippines. Violence-plagued mid-term elections produced a stinging defeat for President Arroyo's Senate team, while corruption scandals spurred another impeachment attempt. The economy was relatively robust, but concerns remain about the country's fiscal health and the long-term effects of a strong peso.

I have written elsewhere: "Where there exists a critical mass of scholars working on similar sets of questions—critiquing and building on one another's work—knowledge accumulation is more likely to occur."1 It is with this statement in mind that I proceed with my response to Michael Nelson's thoughtful critique on my previous article (see Allen Hicken, "Party Fabrication: Constitutional Reform and the Rise of Thai Rack Thai," Journal of East Asian Studies 6, no. 3 [2006]: 381–407). Rather than a point-by-point rebuttal, I will focus on three of the most interesting and challenging of Nelson's theoretical critiques. The first substantive issue concerns the charge of omitted variable bias—specifically, in reference to the omission of local political groups from a macro-institutional account. The second and third criticisms are more methodological. First, can we or should we ascribe motives to political actors? Second, how can we use counterfactuals to solve problems of observational equivalence?

Among the most interesting questions in Thai politics today is how to account for the rise and (until recently) the success of Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai party. This article describes and analyzes some of the factors that contributed to the rise and success of Thaksin and Thai Rak Thai, arguing that neither Thaksin's personal assets nor the effects of the crisis are enough to explain Thai Rak Thai's rise and success. It focuses instead on the 1997 changes to Thailand's constitution. These institutional reforms were crucial because they altered Thailand's political-institutional landscape in fundamental ways. The reforms provided new opportunities and incentives for political actors that Thaksin and his party adeptly took advantage of. The argument presented is that the key reforms that helped pave the way for the rise of Thaksin and Thai Rak Thai were those reforms that helped reduce the number of political parties and that increased the power of the prime minister relative to coalition partners and intraparty factions.