Covering and the moral duty to resist oppression
In: Critical review of international social and political philosophy: CRISPP, Band 24, Heft 7, S. 1068-1075
ISSN: 1743-8772
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In: Critical review of international social and political philosophy: CRISPP, Band 24, Heft 7, S. 1068-1075
ISSN: 1743-8772
In: Hypatia: a journal of feminist philosophy, Band 32, Heft 3, S. 506-522
ISSN: 1527-2001
Answers to the question of immigrant admissions (what policies governing the admission and exclusion of nonrefugee foreigners may states justly adopt?) have been debated extensively by political philosophers since the 1980s. A wide variety of normative approaches to the question have been taken, but very nearly zero have been expressly feminist. Generalizing from Alison Jaggar's articulation of a feminist methodological approach to the political morality of abortion, this article proposes a feminist methodological approach to immigrant admissions. This article does not defend a substantive view on what policies states ought to adopt, but it does describe several features of our social world that are salient for a feminist methodological approach to the assessment of the justice of states' immigrant admissions policies.
In: Public affairs quarterly: PAQ, Band 29, Heft 2
ISSN: 0887-0373
All philosophical defenders of the view that wealthy, liberal states morally ought to eliminate all or most restrictions on immigration maintain that the removal of formal barriers to immigration (that is, the adoption of an open borders immigration regime) by wealthy, liberal states would bring about a significant reduction in global economic inequality and severe poverty. The global egalitarian promise of open borders serves as the primary justification for the proposal in the work of some theorists, while in the work of others, it features as an ancillary argument or as a reply to objections. The rationale for this defense of open borders is that the global poor lack economic opportunities in their countries of residence, but that they could partake of the relatively abundant economic opportunities that wealthy, liberal countries currently reserve for their own legal residents in the absence of formal barriers to immigration. Adapted from the source document.
What moral standards ought nation-states abide by when selecting immigration policies? Peter Higgins argues that immigration policies can only be judged by considering the inequalities that are produced by the institutions – such as gender, race and class – that constitute our social world. He challenges conventional positions on immigration justice, including the view that states have a right to choose whatever immigration policies they like, or that all immigration restrictions ought to be eliminated and borders opened. Rather than suggesting one absolute solution, Higgins argues that a unique set of immigration policies will be just for each country. He concludes with concrete recommendations for policymaking.
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In: Human rights review: HRR, Band 10, Heft 2, S. 291-293
ISSN: 1874-6306
In: Human rights review: HRR, Band 9, Heft 4, S. 525-535
ISSN: 1874-6306
In: Studies in global justice and human rights
Much philosophical work on immigration is founded on an outdated conception of immigrants and the causes on migration. This is based on the model of the pre-World War II European migrant to North America escaping political tyranny, fleeing famine or hoping to claim 'unsettled' land. Higgins draws on empirical evidence to show that the world has changed and reasons for migration have changed too
In: Ethics & international affairs, Band 33, Heft 4, S. 511-513
ISSN: 1747-7093
In: Immigration Justice, S. 1-21
In: Immigration Justice, S. 59-109
In: Immigration Justice, S. 199-232
In: Immigration Justice, S. 110-144
In: Immigration Justice, S. 22-58